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THE GRAPES OF WRATH:  
ON THE HEALTH OF IMMIGRATION 
DETAINEES 
STACEY A. TOVINO, JD, PHD* 
Abstract: This Article challenges the lack of health care provided to individu-
als in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody. As back-
ground, many immigration detainees are physically and emotionally vulnera-
ble at the time of initial confinement due to a history of torture and trauma, 
which may include human trafficking, sexual violence, political oppression, 
psychosocial trauma, and acculturative stress. Detention can exacerbate preex-
isting vulnerabilities and contribute to severe physical and mental illness as 
well as death. Between October 2003 and October 2015, 153 individuals died 
while in ICE custody. Although most proposals for detainee health reform 
borrow heavily from constitutional law, international human rights law, and 
tort law, this Article argues that these areas of the law lack the specificity, en-
forceability, and ex ante perspective necessary, respectively, to effect compre-
hensive reform. Instead, this Article uses state and federal health law as a 
model for change. Involuntary commitment laws, long-term care facility laws, 
and behavioral health laws provide a lens through which the lack of access to 
health care in detention might be assessed and through which the unenforcea-
ble standards governing detention centers might be improved. This Article 
makes eight specific recommendations that, if promulgated by the Department 
of Homeland Security into legally enforceable regulations, will improve the 
health and safety of detainees. 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 6, 2015, Raul Ernesto Morales-Ramos, a forty-four-year-old 
Salvadoran national who had been in U.S. Immigration and Customs En-
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forcement (“ICE”) custody since 2010, died of intestinal cancer.1 The Ade-
lanto Immigration Center in Adelanto, California (“Adelanto”), which ig-
nored Morales-Ramos’s complaints of severe abdominal pain, uncontrolla-
ble leakage of urine, and diarrhea, refused to provide the detainee any med-
ical care.2 
On March 4, 2012, Fernando Dominguez Valdivia, a fifty-eight-year-
old Mexican national, died of multiple organ failure caused by an infection 
that spread to his bloodstream following one hundred days in ICE custody, 
also at Adelanto.3 Following an investigation of his death, the Federal Of-
fice of Detention Oversight (“ODO”) determined that Adelanto’s medical 
staff failed to properly examine Dominguez Valdivia, failed to create medi-
cal records that would ensure the continuity of his health care, and failed to 
access available, off-site health care.4 The ODO concluded that the care 
Dominguez Valdivia received was unacceptable and that his death was pre-
ventable.5 
Morales-Ramos and Dominguez Valdivia are two of 153 detainees who 
died in ICE custody between October 2003 and October 2015.6 Other detain-
ees who died during this time period include Tiombe Kimana Carlos, a thirty-
four-year-old woman with schizophrenia from Antigua and Barbuda who 
hanged herself on October 23, 2013, at York County Jail in York, Pennsylva-
nia, where she had been detained for more than two-and-a-half years.7 An 
ICE report investigating Carlos’s death found a series of lapses in care by the 
jail, including a failure to conduct a health examination within a reasonable 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Kate Linthicum, Salvadoran Immigrant Held at Adelanto ICE Facility Dies, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 7, 2015, 6:37 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-detainee-death-20150407-
story.html [http://perma.cc/N6MF-5RNW]. 
 2 Ray Downs, Immigrant Dies in GEO Group Facility After Three Weeks of Ignored Symp-
toms, Says Attorney, BROWARD PALM BEACH NEW TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.broward
palmbeach.com/news/immigrant-dies-in-geo-group-facility-after-three-weeks-of-ignored-symptoms-
says-attorney-6930614 [http://perma.cc/ARP4-QNRJ]. 
 3 See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, LIST OF DEATHS IN ICE CUSTODY, OCTOBER 
2003–MAY 26, 2015, at 3 (2015) [hereinafter LIST OF DEATHS], https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/FOIA/2015/detaineedeaths2003-present.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6WW-B447] (dis-
closing Dominguez Valdivia’s death, but spelling his name “Dominguez-Valvivia”); Alonso Yáñez, 
Living in the Shadows: Detention Center Deaths Raise Immigrant Rights Questions, UNIVISIÓN (Feb. 
19, 2014), http://newamericamedia.org/2014/02/living-in-the-shadows-detention-centers-deaths-
raise-immigrant-rights-questions.php [http://perma.cc/9FFL-XVMA] (placing Dominguez Valdivia’s 
death in context). 
 4 OFFICE OF DET. OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., COMPLIANCE INSPECTION: 
ADELANTO CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, ADELANTO, CALIFORNIA 2 (2012), https://www.ice.gov/
doclib/foia/odo-compliance-inspections/adelantoCorrectionalFac_Adelanto-CA-Sept_18-20-2012.
pdf [https://perma.cc/4VQA-M3HS] [hereinafter ADELANTO INSPECTION REPORT]. 
 5 Id. (“ODO concluded the detainee’s death could have been prevented and that the detainee 
received an unacceptable level of medical care . . . .”). 
 6 LIST OF DEATHS, supra note 3, at 1–15. 
 7 Id. at 1. 
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time of detention and a failure to implement a treatment plan with measurable 
goals and objectives.8 
This Article tackles a problem that is broad in scope; that is, individu-
als’ general lack of access to physical and mental health care while in de-
tention. Using contemporary health care standards applicable to voluntary 
and involuntary health care providers as a reference point,9 this Article pro-
poses to replace the unenforceable health care guidelines currently set forth 
in ICE’s detention standards10 with rigorous federal regulations.11 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines immigration detain-
ees’ lack of access to adequate physical and mental health care.12 Using 
publicly available information, including ICE’s List of Deaths in ICE Cus-
tody,13 as well as internal detention center investigation reports, autopsy 
reports, and other inter-agency memoranda, Part I identifies the immediate 
causes of detainee deaths, including untreated staph infections, sepsis, tu-
berculosis, pneumonia, meningitis, emphysema, aneurysms, hypertension, 
diabetes complications, HIV complications, cancer, seizure disorders, liver 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Memorandum from Div. Dir., Office of Prof’l Responsibility, U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enf’t, to Thomas Horman, Exec. Assoc. Dir., Enf’t & Removal Operations 2, 5 (July 17, 2014), 
http://media.philly.com/documents/Carlos+Detainee+Death+Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/44TP-
FLGE] [hereinafter Carlos Investigation Memorandum] (noting that Tiombe Kimana Carlos was 
not physically examined until her sixteenth day of detention); ICE Finds Deficiencies at York 
County Prison Related to 2013 Inmate Suicide, YORK DAILY REC. (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.
ydr.com/crime/ci_27448414/ice-releases-report-york-county-prison-inmate-suicide [https://perma.
cc/manage/vest/R35U-MJEL] (reporting same). 
 9 See infra notes 201–370 and accompanying text (arguing that constitutional law, interna-
tional human rights law, and tort law are not the best methods to create comprehensive, nation-
wide detainee health reform). 
 10 See IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERFORMANCE-
BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 277–320 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 PBNDS]; IMMI-
GRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL 
DETENTION STANDARDS (2008) [hereinafter 2008 PBNDS]; U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZA-
TION SERV., NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS (2000) [hereinafter 2000 NDS]. 
 11 See infra notes 371–448 and accompanying text (offering recommendations for creating 
legally enforceable regulations that would improve the health and safety of immigration detain-
ees). In an article published in the Minnesota Law Review, this author analyzed ICE’s widespread 
practice of secluding immigration detainees for lengthy periods of time for purported administra-
tive, disciplinary, or protective reasons. See Stacey A. Tovino, Of Mice and Men: On the Seclu-
sion of Immigration Detainees and Hospital Patients, 100 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2016) 
(manuscript at 4–5) (on file with author). That article focused only on detention centers’ excessive 
use of the seclusion intervention; that is, the involuntary confinement of a detainee alone in a cell 
or other area that the detainee is physically prevented from leaving. Id. (manuscript at 20). Alt-
hough detention centers offer a range of justifications for their frequent use of seclusion, the arti-
cle argued that these justifications are not proportionate to the dangers of seclusion, including the 
risk of injury and death. Id. (manuscript at 21–31). It concluded by proposing structure and con-
tent for new, legally enforceable federal regulations that would limit detention centers’ use of the 
intervention. Id. (manuscript at 42–51).  
 12 See infra notes 31–200 and accompanying text. 
 13 LIST OF DEATHS, supra note 3, at 1–15. 
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failure, renal failure, and multiple organ failure, as well as electrocution, 
drowning, rabies, cardiac arrest, shock, traumatic brain injury, methamphet-
amine intoxication, suicide by hanging, and suicide by other forms of stran-
gulation.14 These deaths are clinically unsurprising; that is, many individu-
als are extremely physically and emotionally vulnerable at the time of initial 
detention due to a history of torture and trauma, which may include human 
trafficking, sexual violence, political oppression, psychosocial trauma, and 
acculturative stress.15 Detention can exacerbate preexisting vulnerabilities 
and contribute to severe physical and mental illness without proper diagno-
sis and treatment.16 
Using internal ICE memoranda as well as interviews with detainees 
conducted by human rights organizations, Part I also identifies the underly-
ing, or root, causes of these deaths, including: detainees’ lack of access to 
comprehensive physical and mental health examinations within a reasona-
ble period of time following detention; individualized plans of care with 
measureable goals and outcomes; timely and proper treatments and follow-
up care; protections from and treatments for infectious diseases; and effec-
tive suicide precautions, including suicide prevention, monitoring, and in-
tervention.17 
Thus far, proposals to improve health care in detention have relied pri-
marily on constitutional prohibitions against punishment without due process 
of law,18 international documents establishing rights to health care,19 interna-
tional human rights prohibitions against cruel, inhuman, and degrading treat-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See id. (identifying each detainee’s cause of death in the right-hand column); infra notes 
96–200 (discussing the many causes of deaths in detention facilities and considering those causes 
that are preventable). 
 15 See RoseMarie Perez Foster, When Immigration Is Trauma: Guidelines for the Individual 
and Family Clinician, 71 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 153, 154 (2001) (“[A]nxiety, depression, 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance abuse, and higher prevalence of serious psychiat-
ric disorders have all been associated with multiple immigrant populations both in and outside of 
the United States.”). 
 16 See, e.g., Amicus Brief of 46 Social Science Researchers and Professors in Support of Peti-
tioners-Appellees/Cross-Appellants and Urging Affirmance at 2, Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 
1127 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-56706) [hereinafter Robbins Brief] (“Prolonged detention exacer-
bates the physical, mental, societal, and economic harms of transitory detention, and presents 
unique harms and risks of its own.” (footnote omitted)). 
 17 See infra notes 45–200 and accompanying text. 
 18 See, e.g., Lisa A. Cahan, Constitutional Protections of Aliens: A Call for Action to Provide 
Adequate Health Care for Immigration Detainees, 3 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 343, 351–54 
(2007) (using constitutional law to argue for improved detainee health care). 
 19 See, e.g., Gwynne Skinner, Bringing International Law to Bear on the Detention of Refu-
gees in the United States, 16 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 270, 272, 293–94 (2008) 
(identifying rights to physical and mental health care set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; concluding that the 
United States is in violation of its obligations to refugees under international law). 
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ment,20 and reasonable care obligations under tort law.21 Although supportive 
of these proposals, Part II of this Article argues that constitutional law, inter-
national human rights law, and tort law lack the specificity, enforceability, and 
ex ante perspective necessary, respectively, to effect comprehensive detainee 
health reform.22 
Rather, Part II offers three sets of health laws that may better guide de-
tainee health reform.23 These laws include state involuntary commitment 
laws,24 federal requirements applicable to long-term care facilities, including 
Medicare-participating skilled nursing facilities and Medicaid-participating 
nursing facilities,25 and federal and state behavioral health laws (collectively, 
the reference laws).26 As explained in more detail in Part II, the reference 
laws require: timely physical and mental health examinations; the creation, 
documentation, and implementation of individualized care plans; adequate 
treatment and follow-up care; comprehensive infection controls; and rigorous 
suicide precautions and monitoring. Part II justifies the use of the reference 
laws as contemporary standards that may be used to assess the adequacy of 
the health care (or lack thereof) provided in immigration detention.27 
Using the reference laws as a benchmark, Part III examines ICE’s cur-
rent detention guidelines, finding them to be legally unenforceable and sub-
stantively inadequate.28 Part III offers eight specific recommendations that, 
if promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security into federal regu-
lations, would improve the health and safety of immigration detainees.29 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See, e.g., Hilary Hamell, The International Human Right to Safe and Humane Treatment 
During Pregnancy and a Theory for Its Application in U.S. Courts, 33 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 
244, 253 (2012) (discussing international human rights’ prohibitions against cruel and inhuman 
treatment in the context of pregnant, laboring, and delivering detainees). 
 21 See, e.g., Note, Improving the Carceral Conditions of Federal Immigration Detainees, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1476, 1491–97 (2012) [hereinafter Improving Carceral Conditions] (proposing the 
classification of nonfederal prison facilities as agents of the federal government under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act as “the most viable approach to ameliorating the carceral conditions of federal 
immigrant detainees”). 
 22 See infra notes 201–370 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 201–370 and accompanying text. 
 24 See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.37(a) (McKinney 2014) (setting forth the standard 
for involuntary inpatient commitment under New York law); id. § 9.60(c)(1)–(7) (setting forth the 
criteria for involuntary outpatient commitment, called “assisted outpatient treatment,” under New 
York law). 
 25 See 42 C.F.R. pt. 483 (2014) (establishing federal requirements for long-term care facili-
ties). 
 26 See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.60–.62 (2014) (establishing the Medicare Conditions of Partici-
pation for Psychiatric Hospitals); COLO. CODE REGS. § 1011-1:XVIII (2014) (regulating psychiat-
ric hospitals in Colorado). 
 27 See infra notes 201–370 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 371–448 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 371–448 and accompanying text. 
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I. DETAINEE HEALTH AND SAFETY CONCERNS 
The United States is home to more than 250 immigration detention 
centers30 that are designed to confine one or more aliens31 pending a deter-
mination regarding whether each alien is to be removed from the United 
States or, once a final order of removal has been entered, initiate the alien’s 
return transportation to his or her country of citizenship.32 In theory, ICE’s 
detention system serves two purposes, including ensuring that aliens are 
available to attend immigration proceedings (i.e., preventing flight) and seg-
regating aliens from community members to whom they may pose a safety 
risk (i.e., protecting the community).33 Data showing that most detainees 
have committed only minor or non-violent crimes, if any, and are not flight 
or safety risks effectively counter these theories.34 
In 2013, the most recent year for which data are available from the Fed-
eral Office of Immigration Statistics, ICE detained nearly 441,000 individu-
als,35 ninety percent of whom were nationals of Mexico, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, or El Salvador.36 Scholars have detailed a number of serious concerns 
associated with ICE’s detention system, including detainees’ grossly inade-
                                                                                                                           
 30 Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/detention-management#wcmsurvey-target-id [http://perma.cc/B8N2
-8CYT]. 
 31 An alien is a person who is neither a U.S. citizen nor national. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) 
(2012). 
 32 This sentence and its internal references and citations first appeared in Tovino, supra note 
11, manuscript at 10–11, and is re-printed here with permission of the author. For additional back-
ground regarding the United States’ immigration detention system, see Tovino, supra note 11, 
manuscript at 10–31 (summarizing the ownership, operation, and management of the United 
States’ immigration detention centers and thoroughly documenting critiques of this system by civil 
rights, human rights, and immigrant advocacy groups, as well as by legal scholars, law school-
based immigration clinics, and other stakeholders). 
 33 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001) (discussing the two justifications for 
immigration detention). 
 34 See, e.g., Yolanda Vazquez, Constructing Crimmigration: Latino Subordination in a 
“Post-Racial” World, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 605 (2015) (noting that the vast majority of those 
removed as “criminal aliens” are removed for non-violent offenses); Adina B. Appelbaum, Note, 
Challenging Crimmigration: Applying Padilla Negotiation Strategies Outside the Criminal Court-
room, 6 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 217, 219–20 (2014) (“[A] significant number 
of those deported with criminal convictions . . . have been convicted only of relatively minor or 
nonviolent crimes . . . . Today, the largest deportation increases are of immigrants with traffic 
violations . . . .”). 
 35 JOHN F. SIMANSKI, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS: 2013, at 1, 5 & tbls.5 & 6 (2014) (“ICE detained 440,557 aliens during 2013, a decrease 
of 8 percent from 2012.”); see Immigration Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://
www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics [http://perma.cc/66CX-PT8F] (providing statistics regarding 
immigration enforcement actions from 2013 but not for later years). 
 36 SIMANSKI, supra note 35, at 5 tbls.5 & 6 (providing numbers and percentages of aliens 
detained by country of citizenship). 
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quate and inhumane living conditions,37 detainees’ severely limited recreation 
and visitation opportunities,38 the excessive and inappropriate use of the re-
straint and seclusion interventions by detention center staff,39 the abuse of 
power by detention center staff,40 and the high rates of all types of detainee 
abuse, including physical, sexual, and emotional abuse.41 Legal scholars, in 
particular, also have identified significant due process concerns,42 human 
rights concerns,43 and empirical concerns44 associated with the U.S. system of 
detention and deportation. This Article makes an important contribution to 
this literature by examining one particular concern that requires further aca-
demic analysis and comprehensive change: immigration detainees’ lack of 
access to adequate physical and mental health care. 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See Nina Rabin, Immigration Detention in Arizona: A Quietly Growing System Crying Out 
for Reform, 45 ARIZ. ATT’Y 31, 31 (2009) (detailing detainees’ poor living conditions). 
 38 See DET. WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: BAKER COUNTY JAIL, FLORIDA 3 (2012), 
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/expose-bakernov12.
pdf [http://perma.cc/TSF6-7AFM] [hereinafter BAKER COUNTY JAIL REPORT] (reporting a lack of 
outdoor recreation); DET. WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: ONE YEAR LATER 6–8 (2013), 
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/expose-1yrlaternov13
_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q3DZ-ZXUH] (reporting a lack of visitation and outdoor recreation). 
 39 See Tovino, supra note 11, manuscript at 2, 10–31 (proposing stringent federal regulations 
that would limit detention centers’ use of restraint and seclusion). 
 40 See AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF GA., PRISONERS OF PROFIT: IMMIGRANTS AND DETEN-
TION IN GEORGIA 12, 106 (2012), http://www.acluga.org/files/2713/3788/2900/Prisoners_of_
Profit.pdf [http://perma.cc/7ABD-UD9V] [hereinafter PRISONERS OF PROFIT] (“[G]uards overstep 
their authority by being verbally and physically abusive to detainees, retaliating against detainees 
for small infractions . . . .”). 
 41 See DET. WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: THEO LACY DETENTION CENTER, CALI-
FORNIA 3–4 (2012), http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files
/expose-theolacynov12.pdf [http://perma.cc/TV67-S2UX] [hereinafter THEO LACY DETENTION 
CENTER REPORT] (reporting detainee physical and psychological abuse). 
 42 See, e.g., Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration 
Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 363 (2014) (arguing that the mandatory detention statute should 
be construed to govern detention for no longer than six months, after which time a bond hearing 
should be required); Fatma E. Marouf, Incompetent but Deportable: The Case for a Right to Men-
tal Competence in Removal Proceedings, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 929, 967–80 (2014) (arguing that 
courts should recognize a substantive due process right to competence in removal proceedings). 
 43 See, e.g., Michelle Brané & Christiana Lundholm, Human Rights Behind Bars: Advancing 
the Rights of Immigration Detainees in the United States Through Human Rights Frameworks, 22 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 164 (2008) (exploring possibilities for holding U.S. detention officials 
accountable to international human rights standards). 
 44 See Fatma Marouf et al., Justice on the Fly: The Danger of Errant Deportations, 75 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 337, 337–404 (2014) (shedding light on the doctrinal controversies surrounding stays of 
removal by empirically analyzing 1646 cases in all the circuits that hear immigration appeals; 
finding that the circuit courts denied stays of removal in about half of the appeals that were ulti-
mately granted, “an alarming type of error that could result in people being errantly deported to 
countries where they risk persecution or torture”). 
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A. Examination and Treatment 
Immigration detention centers routinely fail to provide physical and 
mental health examinations of detainees within a reasonable time following 
their detention.45 When examinations are conducted, detention centers fre-
quently misdiagnose or fail to diagnose chronic and acute health condi-
tions.46 When a health condition is diagnosed, some detention centers fail to 
create, document, and implement appropriate plans of care.47 Even when a 
plan of care is established, medications orders and other forms of treatment 
may be delayed, ignored, or canceled.48 As discussed in more detail below, 
many detainees become sick and die without proper examination, diagnosis, 
and treatment.49 
For example, the Eloy Detention Center in Eloy, Arizona (“Eloy”), re-
fused to conduct a physical examination of thirty-two-year-old Jose Lopez-
Gregorio, a Guatemalan national, until his twenty-first day of detention.50 
After Lopez-Gregorio finally received a physical examination, medical staff 
ignored for seven days a sick call placed by the detainee.51 Lopez-Gregorio 
hanged himself with a bed sheet on September 29, 2006.52 An ICE report 
investigating Lopez-Gregorio’s suicide stated, “Medical care in this facility 
does not meet ICE standards. Physical examinations are not occurring with-
in 14 days and a sick call request made by [the detainee] was deferred for 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See, e.g., Flores v. United States, 689 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Although ICE stand-
ards require a physical examination within fourteen days of a detainee’s arrival at a facility, 
Iñamagua was not examined.”). 
 46 See, e.g., Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, Suicides Point to Gaps in Treatment, WASH. POST 
(May 13, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/immigration/cwc_d3p1.
html [http://perma.cc/F5YX-PAPJ] (“[S]ome psychiatric patients undergo months and sometimes 
years of undermedication or overmedication, misdiagnosis or no diagnosis.”). 
 47 See, e.g., Carlos Investigation Memorandum, supra note 8, at 28 (“[Detainee Tiombe 
Kimana] Carlos’s medical record does not document any treatment plan . . . at [York County 
Jail].”). 
 48 See, e.g., Priest & Goldstein, supra note 46 (reporting the story of detainee Junior Bannis-
ter, who was not given his medication for five months following a detention official’s order for 
such medication). 
 49 See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 19, Woods v. Myers, No. 07-
cv-01078-DMS-PCL (S.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Woods Complaint] (“The failure to 
properly monitor detainees with chronic illnesses and to appreciate the complications that can 
arise from poor disease management has had grave consequences at [San Diego Correctional Fa-
cility].”); infra notes 50–96 (providing examples of individual detainees who became very ill or 
died without receiving proper medical treatment). 
 50 Memorandum from Det. & Deportation Officer, Det. Standards Compliance Unit, Office of 
Det. & Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Securi-
ty, to John P. Torres, Dir., Office of Det. & Removal Operations 1 (Oct. 11, 2006), https://bsl.
app.box.com/s/7n451fvcsmas6jjy3jhu8ubuonhpyrwz [https://perma.cc/2RYG-U8HZ] [hereinafter 
Lopez-Gregorio Investigation Memorandum]. 
 51 Id. at 1–2. 
 52 LIST OF DEATHS, supra note 3, at 8; see also Priest & Goldstein, supra note 46. 
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seven days.”53 The report concluded, “The most significant concern was 
found in the areas of 14-day physical examinations that are being conducted 
at 21 days and the lack of responsiveness to requests for sick call[s] . . . .”54 
Eloy also has no record of conducting a physical examination of twen-
ty-seven-year-old Mario Francisco Chavez-Torres, a Colombian national 
who displayed symptoms of a brain aneurysm, including weakness and diz-
ziness, and died of that aneurysm on December 13, 2006.55 Eloy does have 
a record, however, showing that Chavez-Torres placed a sick call from soli-
tary confinement and that the sick call was ignored for four days.56 When a 
nurse finally responded, she took one hour to walk to Chavez-Torres’s cell, 
located two minutes from the medical staff office.57 Once she arrived, the 
nurse told the officer who worked there that she was not qualified to assess 
Chavez-Torres’s health condition: “I am only a pill pusher.”58 There is no 
medical record evidence showing that a physician ever saw Chavez-Torres 
at Eloy.59 An ICE memorandum investigating his death concluded that 
Chavez-Torres should have been referred for outside treatment and that 
Eloy failed to protect Chavez-Torres’s health, safety, and welfare.60 
Eloy is not the only detention center to ignore evidence of poor detain-
ee health. Medical staff at Stewart Detention Facility in Lumpkin, Georgia, 
failed to treat Roberto Medina-Martinez, a thirty-nine-year-old Mexican 
national, despite clear evidence of the detainee’s myocarditis, an inflamma-
tion of the heart muscle that is usually caused by a viral infection and is of-
ten treatable.61 Following Medina-Martinez’s death on March 11, 2009,62 
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) of Georgia on behalf of Me-
dina-Martinez’s widow sued the federal government under the Federal Tort 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Lopez-Gregorio Investigation Memorandum, supra note 50, at 1. 
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 56 Chavez-Torres Assessment, supra note 55, at 5. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
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 61 See DET. WATCH NETWORK, STEWART DETENTION CENTER, GEORGIA 3–4 (2012), 
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/expose-stewartnov
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ATL. J.-CONST. (July 18, 2012, 5:30 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/immigrants-wro
ngful-death-suit-settled/nQXLJ/ [http://perma.cc/HG8T-AX6X] (discussing the lawsuit filed fol-
lowing Medina-Martinez’s death). 
 62 LIST OF DEATHS, supra note 3, at 5. 
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Claims Act in a one million dollar wrongful-death lawsuit.63 The govern-
ment settled with the plaintiff in 2012 for an undisclosed sum.64 
Other detention centers also have ignored clear evidence of serious 
medical conditions, eventually resulting in detainee death. Upon his admis-
sion to the San Diego Correctional Facility (“SDCF”) on March 27, 2006, 
for example, Salvadoran national Francisco Castaneda told SDCF medical 
staff about a white and yellow raised lesion on the foreskin of his penis that 
was bleeding and discharging pus.65 A consulting urologist, who examined 
Castaneda almost three months later, recommended an immediate biopsy 
and definitive treatment due to his concern about a malignancy and the risk 
of morbidity associated with untreated lesions.66 Notwithstanding the urolo-
gist’s recommendation, the Division of Immigration Health Services within 
the U.S. Public Health Service declined to approve the standard diagnostic 
procedure, classifying the biopsy as elective.67 
Without treatment, Castaneda’s lesion continued to grow in size, caus-
ing the detainee considerable pain and suffering.68 On November 17, 2006, 
officials transferred Castaneda from SDCF to the San Pedro Service Pro-
cessing Center (“SPSPC”).69 The paperwork that accompanied Castaneda 
on his transfer stated that he had “no ‘current medical problems.’”70 Cas-
taneda’s condition continued to deteriorate, and consulting physicians con-
tinued to recommend definitive diagnosis and urgent treatment.71 Instead of 
approving these requests, ICE released Castaneda from custody on February 
5, 2007.72 Immediately upon his release, Castaneda presented to the emer-
gency room of a local hospital.73 After performing a biopsy, physicians the 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See Complaint at 7–8, Hernandez-Gonzalez v. United States, No. 4-12-CV-75 (M.D. Ga. 
Aug. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Hernandez-Gonzalez Complaint] (alleging that the government’s 
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 64 Redmon, supra note 61. 
 65 Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 684 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Hui v. Cas-
taneda, 559 U.S. 799 (2010). 
 66 Castaneda, 546 F.3d at 685. 
 67 Id.; see Robert Barnes, Immigrant’s Survivors Cannot Sue Federal Health Officials, Su-
preme Court Rules, WASH. POST (May 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2010/05/03/AR2010050304419.html [http://perma.cc/8P5B-HFWS] (“Despite advice from 
three specialists who recommended a biopsy . . . U.S. Public Health Service doctors called the 
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 73 Id.; see Adam Liptak, Justices Agree on Detainee Death Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/us/04scotus.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/996X-RMJH] (re-
porting Castaneda’s story). 
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hospital diagnosed Castaneda with squamous cell carcinoma, a type of skin 
cancer, and amputated his penis, leaving a two-centimeter stump.74 Unfor-
tunately, the surgery did not save Castaneda’s life.75 Castaneda died on Feb-
ruary 16, 2008, at the age of thirty-six, of metastatic cancer.76 The federal 
government later conceded negligence in its treatment of Castaneda77 and 
the Castaneda family received $3.2 million in two separate settlements.78 
The deaths of Lopez-Gregorio, Chavez-Torres, Medina-Martinez, and 
Castaneda gained national attention from civil liberties, human rights, and 
other legal organizations. In 2011, the ACLU of Arizona issued a report 
documenting 115 face-to-face interviews it conducted with detainees and 
more than 500 grievances authored by detainees.79 The report highlighted 
systemic civil and human rights abuses in several key areas, including defi-
cient physical and mental health care.80 In 2012, the ACLU of Georgia is-
sued a similar report detailing detainee conditions in Georgia, emphasizing 
“serious concerns about . . . inadequate medical and mental health care.”81 
In 2012, Detention Watch Network, a national coalition of organiza-
tions and individuals working to expose and challenge the injustices associ-
ated with immigration detention and deportation,82 released ten “Expose 
and Close” reports documenting poor conditions in detention centers locat-
ed across the United States.83 Among other serious concerns, the reports 
highlight detainees’ lack of access to adequate physical and mental health 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Castaneda, 546 F.3d at 686. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Henry Weinstein, Feds’ Actions ‘Beyond Cruel’: Immigration Officials Failed to Treat 
Detainee Who Later Died of Cancer, a Judge Says, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2008), http://articles.la
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 78 See Court Approves $1.25 Million Settlement for Family of Deceased Prisoner Francisco 
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tember 2014); Editorial, Obama’s Moral Obligation to Detainees Regardless of Immigration Status, 
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/08/opinion/la-ed-detention-
20110408 [http://perma.cc/3YL7-6UM7] (reporting a $1.95 million wrongful death settlement 
with the federal government in April 2011). 
 79 AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF ARIZ., IN THEIR OWN WORDS: ENDURING ABUSE IN ARI-
ZONA IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTERS 2 (2011), http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/
documents/detention%20report%202011.pdf [http://perma.cc/R6KV-N5MR] (summarizing the 
report). 
 80 Id. 
 81 PRISONERS OF PROFIT, supra note 40, at 12. 
 82 Who We Are, DET. WATCH NETWORK, http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/whoweare 
[http://perma.cc/7YJ7-U6EG]. 
 83 Detention Watch Network Expose and Close Reports on 10 of the Worst Immigrant Prisons 
in the US, DET. WATCH NETWORK, http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/ExposeAndClose 
[http://perma.cc/EE3H-CJ2R] (linking to all ten reports). 
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care in Baker County Jail in Macclenny, Florida,84 Etowah County Jail in 
Gadsden, Alabama,85 Houston Processing Center in Houston, Texas,86 Hud-
son County Jail in Kearny, New Jersey,87 Irwin County Detention Center in 
Ocilla, Georgia,88 Pinal County Jail in Florence, Arizona,89 Polk County 
Detention Facility in Livingston, Texas,90 Stewart Detention Center in 
Lumpkin, Georgia,91 Theo Lacy Detention Center in Orange, California,92 
and Tri-County Detention Center in Ullin, Illinois.93 The Detention Watch 
Network reports reveal not just that preventable deaths occur in ICE custo-
dy, but also that detainees who manage to survive their confinement experi-
ence significant pain and suffering due to a lack of health care.94 
Even the federal government—the Office of Inspector General within 
the Department of Homeland Security—has reported that more than fifty 
percent of the individuals detained at one California detention center whose 
records government officials reviewed did not receive a physical examina-
tion within fourteen days of admission and were not seen by a doctor or 
other qualified health professional within seventy-two hours of a formal 
request for health care.95 
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 90 DET. WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: POLK COUNTY DETENTION FACILITY, TEXAS 
4 (2012), http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/expose-
polknov12.pdf [http://perma.cc/R5XN-4KLR] [hereinafter POLK COUNTY DETENTION FACILITY 
REPORT]. 
 91 STEWART DETENTION CENTER REPORT, supra note 61, at 3–4. 
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 93 DET. WATCH NETWORK, EXPOSE & CLOSE: TRI-COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, ILLINOIS 4 
(2012), http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/expose-tri
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 95 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TREATMENT OF IMMIGRA-
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Indeed, ICE’s own List of Deaths in ICE Custody hints at additional 
access problems and reveals a wide range of causes of death in detention, 
including untreated staph infections, sepsis, tuberculosis, pneumonia, men-
ingitis, emphysema, aneurysms, hypertension, diabetes complications, HIV 
complications, cancer, seizure disorders, liver failure, renal failure, and mul-
tiple organ failure, as well as electrocution, drowning, rabies, cardiac arrest, 
shock, traumatic brain injury, methamphetamine intoxication, suicide by 
hanging, and suicide by other forms of strangulation.96 Some of these deaths 
are discussed in further detail below. 
B. Infection Control 
Due to a lack of comprehensive infection controls, many immigration 
detainees contract contagious, preventable, treatable infections, and some 
die of these infections. On July 12, 2014, Santiago Sierra-Sanchez, a Mexi-
can national, died at Utah County Jail in Spanish Fork, Utah.97 Although 
Sierra-Sanchez had complained of severe back pain, medical officials failed 
to conduct any diagnostic tests to determine the cause of his distress. The 
Utah State Medical Examiner later determined that Sierra-Sanchez died of 
staphylococcus aureus,98 a treatable infection.99 
On November 28, 2009, forty-eight-year-old German national Guido 
Newbrough died after eleven months in ICE custody at Piedmont Regional 
Jail in Farmville, Virginia.100 Newbrough, who had lived in the United 
States for forty-two years and proudly wore a “Raised American” tattoo on 
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 97 Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, ICE Detainee Dies at Utah Hospital 
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 98 LIST OF DEATHS, supra note 3, at 1. 
 99 See, e.g., Kevin E. Chan et al., Prevalence and Outcomes of Antimicrobial Treatment for 
Staphylococcus Aureus Bacteremia in Outpatients with ESRD, 23 J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 
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tions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/us/28detain.html [http://
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his shoulder, died of endocarditis caused by a virulent staph infection that is 
typically cured by antibiotics.101 
In addition to failing to diagnose infections, detention centers also poor-
ly manage known infections. For example, Jose Javier Hernandez-Valencia, a 
forty-four-year-old Mexican national was diagnosed with possible tuberculo-
sis upon his detention, which began February 21, 2014 at the Houston Con-
tract Detention Facility in Houston Texas.102 Despite the facility’s knowledge 
of his preventable and curable infection,103 Hernandez-Valencia received no 
further diagnostic examinations or treatment.104 On April 12, 2014, he died 
from complications of tuberculosis.105 
The experience of Martin Hernandez Banderas further illustrates de-
tention centers’ inadequate management of known infections. Shortly after 
his October 26, 2006, arrival at SDCF in Otay Mesa, California, Banderas 
incurred a minor foot injury.106 The injury turned into an infected ulcer that 
eventually turned gangrenous.107 Although Banderas complained of increas-
ing pain in his foot and foul-smelling discharge from the ulcer, a physician 
at SDCF ignored these complaints as well as laboratory tests suggesting that 
the general antibiotic initially given to treat Banderas’s infection was not 
working.108 On January 17, 2007, Banderas was rushed to a local emergen-
cy room, where he was diagnosed with a bone infection as well as gangre-
nous tissue surrounding the infected area.109 Banderas, who required six 
weeks of inpatient intravenous antibiotics and several operations, was in 
danger of losing his leg.110 Banderas sued SDCF and other defendants based 
on negligence and other tort theories of liability, and the U.S. District Court 
for the Central District of California found that the physician at SDCF was 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See Bernstein, supra note 100 (“An autopsy report last week cited a virulent staph infec-
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 105 LIST OF DEATHS, supra note 3, at 1. 
 106 Woods Complaint, supra note 49, at 19. 
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 108 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 7, Martin Hernandez Banderas v. United 
States, No. 2:08-cv-6594-PSG (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2012) [hereinafter Banderas Findings]; Woods 
Complaint, supra note 49, at 19. 
 109 Banderas Findings, supra note 108, at 5–6. 
 110 Woods Complaint, supra note 49, at 20. 
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negligent in failing to diagnose and treat Banderas.111 The Court awarded 
Banderas $250,000 in civil damages.112 
Children in detention also suffer from poor control of infections as well 
as other contagious conditions. In December 2014, for example, volunteer 
attorneys representing families in ICE custody at the Artesia Family Residen-
tial Center in Artesia, New Mexico (“Artesia”), reported several cases of un-
treated scabies, lice, and chickenpox, in addition to pneumonia, tonsillitis, 
fevers, vomiting, malnourishment, and emaciation, among the children de-
tained at Artesia.113 The story is the same at detention centers across the coun-
try. After touring detention centers in Brownsville and McAllen, Texas, offi-
cials from the Texas State Department of Health Services (“TSDHS”) stated 
their belief that the detention conditions in Brownsville and McAllen “pose a 
high potential for infectious disease outbreak among the children and 
staff.”114 A spokeswoman for TSDHS told the media, “The conditions are not 
healthy and not acceptable for children by Texas and national public health 
standards.”115 
C. Suicide Prevention and Intervention 
Suicide is the leading cause of death in detention.116 Many immigration 
detainees with mental illness who do not receive adequate treatment attempt 
suicide. As an illustration, thirty-one-year-old Jose de Jesus Deniz-Sahagun, 
a Mexican national, committed suicide at Eloy Detention Center on May 
20, 2015.117 The day before his suicide, Deniz-Sahagun was assessed for 
delusional thoughts and behaviors and placed on suicide watch.118 The day 
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5CFN]; Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, ICE Detainee Passes Away at Eloy 
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of his suicide, the detainee was removed from suicide watch and placed on 
fifteen-minute checks in an isolation cell. Sometime between checks, Den-
iz-Sahagun asphyxiated himself by stuffing a knee-high orange sock down 
his throat.119 During his autopsy, the medical examiner also found a small 
white plastic handle, perhaps a toothbrush, inside his stomach.120 
Eloy has a poor track record when it comes to suicide prevention and 
intervention. Twenty-four-year-old Elsa Guadalupe-Gonzales, a Guatema-
lan national, also committed suicide by hanging at Eloy on April 28, 
2013.121 Two days later, forty-year-old Jorge Garcia-Mejia, also a Guatema-
lan national, hanged himself at Eloy as well.122 In its news release regarding 
Garcia-Mejia’s hanging, ICE blamed Garcia-Mejia for “not seek[ing] any 
medical or mental health treatment.”123 ICE also stated, however, that it 
would deploy mental health professionals to Eloy to identify the root causes 
of the suicides that had occurred there and provide suicide prevention and 
awareness training.124 
Although ICE later found Eloy to be “‘fully compliant’ with national 
standards on suicide prevention,”125 fourteen detainees have died at Eloy 
between October 2003 and October 2015,126 including six by “hanging” or 
“asphyxia.”127 In addition to Deniz-Sahagun, Garcia-Mejia, and Guadalupe-
Gonzales, sixty-two-year-old Emmanuel Owusu, a barber from Ghana, 
hanged himself at Eloy on October 6, 2008.128 Owusu had been a permanent 
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legal resident living in Chicago for thirty-three years prior to his 2006 de-
tention, which was based on 1979 convictions for misdemeanor battery and 
retail theft.129 
The fifth Eloy suicide occurred on September 29, 2006, when thirty-
two-year-old Jose Lopez-Gregorio, a Guatemalan national, hanged himself 
with a bed sheet.130 Lopez-Gregorio, whom staff members described as 
sobbing and depressed near the end of his detention, was guilt ridden for 
having left his wife and children in Guatemala with insufficient food.131 
When Lopez-Gregorio placed a sick call, medical staff at Eloy ignored the 
call for seven days.132 Five days before his suicide, correctional staff placed 
Lopez-Gregorio on suicide watch after hearing from other detainees that he 
had a suicide plan.133 Later that day, a staff psychologist discontinued the 
suicide watch, assessing Lopez-Gregorio’s risk of suicide as low, and placed 
him on fifteen-minute checks instead.134 Lopez-Gregorio committed suicide 
on September 29, 2006.135 
An ICE report investigating Lopez-Gregorio’s death stated, “[L]imited 
efforts were being made to assist the detainee. The detainee did display sui-
cidal ideologies before his death. His suicide appears to have been planned 
in advance and did not appear to be spontaneous.”136 The report further stat-
ed, “Any [sick call] request made by a detainee who is known to be de-
spondent and who is on an intensive watch schedule should have been re-
sponded to with some sense of urgency.”137 The report ultimately concluded 
that, “Staff were viewed as caring and considerate and tried to communicate 
with the detainee, however, lacking critical expertise, such as that possessed 
by medical staff, did not foresee the outcome. The medical staff did not re-
spond to [the] detainee[’s] request in a time appropriate manner.”138 The 
report also suggested a root cause of the event: “Medical staff appear to 
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have been overwhelmed due to a sudden loss of veteran staff and [had] no 
emergency plan to properly address this deficiency.”139 A sixth Eloy death, 
that of twenty-nine-year-old Mexican national Juan Salazar-Gomez, oc-
curred on December 14, 2005.140 Although ICE records publicly indicate 
that Salazar-Gomez died of asphyxia,141 leading newspapers and grassroots 
organizations report the death as a suicide.142 
Eloy is not the only place of detention to struggle with suicide preven-
tion and intervention. Forty-seven-year-old Chinese national Qi Gen Guo 
committed suicide at the Clinton County Correctional Facility in McElhat-
tan, Pennsylvania, on February 23, 2011, day nine of his detention.143 Simi-
larly, forty-four-year-old Salvadoran national Ana Romero Rivera hanged 
herself at Franklin County Regional Jail in Frankford, Kentucky, on August 
21, 2008.144 
Romero Rivera’s case is somewhat unique in that law enforcement of-
ficials placed her in the local jail on August 7, 2008, while waiting for ICE 
to make custodial arrangements.145 Although federal regulations state that 
individuals who are being investigated for removal may be held in local 
jails for a maximum of forty-eight hours (excluding weekends and holi-
days),146 Romero Rivera was jailed for a total of fourteen days, ending on 
the day of her suicide.147 ICE, which had planned to take custody of 
Romero Rivera on day fifteen, provided no reason for not taking her into 
custody within the required time period.148 Of note, ICE does not count 
Romero Rivera as one of the 153 detainees who died in custody between 
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Death, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.kentucky.com/latest-news/
article43983495.html [http://perma.cc/L7PZ-CJW6] (reporting that Romero was held awaiting 
deportation in county jail eleven days beyond the permitted forty-eight-hour hold before she was 
found hanging in her cell in the county jail). 
 145 Id. 
 146 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2014). 
 147 Lannen & Spears, supra note 144. 
 148 Id. 
2016] Improving the Health of Immigration Detainees 185 
October 2003 and October 2015149 because, technically, ICE had not yet 
taken custody of her.150 Therefore, the 153 number does not reflect the full 
scope of harm, nor does it include the numbers of individuals who died after 
detention due to inadequate care while in detention. 
Perhaps not wanting to draw attention to the high rate of suicide in de-
tention, ICE publicly and generically identifies the final cause of death as as-
phyxia, not suicide, in a number of additional deaths.151 Deaths publicly clas-
sified by ICE as asphyxia, not suicide, include: Rogelio Canales Baca, a thir-
ty-six-year-old Honduran national who died on July 8, 2008, at Pinal County 
Jail in Florence, Arizona;152 Nery Romero, a twenty-two-year-old Salvadoran 
national who died on February 12, 2007, at the Bergen County Jail in Hack-
ensack, New Jersey;153 Antonio Martinez-Rivas, a forty-four-year-old Mexi-
can national who died on October 4, 2006, at the Houston Contract Detention 
Facility in Houston, Texas;154 Carlos Cortez-Raudel, a twenty-two-year-old 
Mexican national who died on October 3, 2006, at the Mira Loma Detention 
Center in Lancaster, California;155 Geovanny Garcia-Mejia, a Honduran na-
tional who died on March 18, 2006, his twenty-seventh birthday, at the New-
ton County Correctional Center in Newton, Texas;156 Felipe Garcia-Sanchez, 
a twenty-one-year-old Colombian national who died on February 13, 2006, at 
the Federal Detention Center in Oakdale, Louisiana;157 Hassiba Belbachir, a 
twenty-seven-year-old Algerian national who died on March 17, 2005, at 
McHenry County Jail in Woodstock, Illinois;158 Sung Soo Heo, a Korean na-
tional who died three days after his fifty-first birthday on February 16, 2005, 
at Passaic County Jail in Paterson, New Jersey;159 Ervin Ruiz-Tabares, a 
twenty-four-year-old Colombian national who died on September 25, 2004, 
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at the Guaynabo Metropolitan Detention Center on San Juan, Puerto Rico;160 
Sebastian Mejia Vicentes, a twenty-seven-year-old Mexican national who 
died on August 22, 2004, at the Hampton Roads Regional Jail in Portsmouth, 
Virginia;161 Cesar Rioz-Martinez, a twenty-six-year-old Mexican national 
who died on February 13, 2004, at the Frio County Jail in Pearsall, Texas;162 
and Argelio Leyva-Arjona, a fifty-year-old Cuban national who died on Janu-
ary 5, 2004, at a Federal Bureau of Prisons facility in Victorville, Califor-
nia.163 
It is certainly possible for a detainee to die of asphyxia, defined as the 
deprivation of oxygen or the state of not being able to breathe,164 outside the 
context of suicide. For example, a detainee could accidentally choke on a 
piece of food and asphyxiate himself. Or, one detainee could strangle an-
other. Nevertheless, internal ICE documentation maintained separately from 
its public List of Deaths confirms that many of the deaths generically classi-
fied as asphyxia were actually suicides by hanging or other forms of self-
strangulation.165 
For example, an internal ICE Detention Facility Inspection Form used 
to document an August 2008 inspection of Pinal County Jail in Florence, 
Arizona (Pinal) states that Pinal staff found Rogelio Canales Baca hanging 
in his cell on July 8, 2008,166 even though ICE’s public List of Deaths states 
that Canales Baca died of asphyxia.167 Because Pinal staff had segregated 
Canales Baca from the general detention center population,168 the hanging 
was almost certainly a suicide, not a homicide. Indeed, ICE’s own Inspec-
tion Form uses an “S” to indicate that the death was a suicide, not the result 
of an act of violence, an illness, or other cause.169 Notwithstanding the sui-
cide of Canales Baca, as well as the suicide by hanging of a second Pinal 
inmate on July 16, 2008, only eight days after Canales Baca’s suicide,170 
ICE inspectors still gave Pinal an “acceptable” rating with respect to Pinal’s 
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suicide prevention and intervention efforts171 as well as an overall rating of 
“acceptable.”172 Pinal did receive a “deficient” rating with respect to medi-
cal care, however.173 
Leading journalists also have reported that many of the deaths ICE 
publicly and generically classifies as asphyxia were suicides by hanging or 
other forms of self-strangulation.174 The Washington Post reported that 
twenty-two-year-old Mexican national Carlos Cortez-Raudel, whose Octo-
ber 3, 2006, death ICE publicly classified as asphyxia,175 actually “hanged 
himself from a tree on the way to breakfast in a California compound.”176 
The Washington Post further reported that twenty-seven-year-old Algerian 
national Hassiba Belbachir, whose March 17, 2005, death ICE publicly 
classified as asphyxia,177 “strangled herself with orange jail-issue socks, 
which she knotted together and wrapped twice around her neck.”178 
Belbachir, as with most noncitizens, was neither a criminal nor a pub-
lic safety risk. After marrying a U.S. citizen, Belbachir traveled to Chicago 
to live with her new husband.179 After four weeks in Chicago, Belbachir 
discovered that the man she married had another wife.180 To leave the Amer-
ican who deceived her, Belbachir traveled to Spain but was denied entry 
due to a lack of a visa.181 She returned to the United States, requested politi-
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cal asylum, and was taken into ICE custody on March 8, 2005,182 at 
McHenry County Jail in Woodstock, Illinois (“McHenry”).183 
Records from Belbachir’s intake screening, conducted by a social 
worker at McHenry, document a prior suicide attempt that involved drink-
ing soap.184 The social worker diagnosed Belbachir with major depressive 
disorder, noted that she needed to see a psychiatrist for medication, and 
scheduled Belbachir for an appointment with a psychiatrist ten days later, 
on March 18, 2005, at 6:00 p.m.185 On March 12, 2005, six days before her 
scheduled medical appointment, Belbachir suffered a panic attack and was 
placed in the jail’s medical unit.186 The following day, Belbachir told the 
social worker that she could hear “parasites and radio waves,” that “[d]eath 
is dripping, drop by drop,” and that she wanted to die.187 Despite her stated 
desire to die and her known previous suicide attempt, Belbachir was not 
placed on suicide watch.188 
On March 17, 2005, the day before her scheduled medical appoint-
ment, a guard noticed that she was lying face down on the floor of her cell 
at 3:40 p.m.189 The guard, who could not see Belbachir’s face, inquired of a 
colleague whether that was Belbachir’s normal sleeping position and was 
told that it was.190 When the guard returned to Belbachir’s cell at approxi-
mately 4:10 p.m. to serve her dinner, he discovered that she had socks 
around her neck, that her face was purple, and that her mouth was bloody.191 
Belbachir had strangled herself one day and approximately two hours be-
fore her scheduled medical appointment.192 
Equally heartbreaking is the story of Nery Romero, a twenty-two-year-
old Salvadoran national who hanged himself with his bed sheets at the Ber-
gen County Jail in Hackensack, New Jersey, on February 12, 2007.193 Alt-
hough the local sheriff’s office suggested that Romero hanged himself out 
of fear for the gangs that awaited him in El Salvador,194 Romero’s family, 
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his fellow detainees, and the attorney hired to investigate his death believe 
he committed suicide due to his lack of access to health care, including pain 
medication, in detention.195 As background, Romero had been involved in a 
serious motorcycle accident that crushed one of his legs and required surgi-
cally implanted metal rods for support.196 Following surgery, Romero was 
prescribed strong medication to alleviate his pain.197 Romero’s family be-
lieved that detention center officials refused to give Romero his pain medi-
cation once in detention even though the medication’s instructions warned 
that abruptly stopping the medication can cause severe cramps, anxiety, in-
somnia, and other uncomfortable symptoms.198 Federal investigators later 
agreed, finding that “unbearable, untreated pain had been a significant fac-
tor” in Romero’s death.199 Investigators also found that jail personnel falsi-
fied a medication log to show that Romero had been given Motrin for his 
pain when he had not: “The fake entry was easy to detect: When the drug 
was supposedly administered, Mr. Romero was already dead.”200 
The numerous stories of detainees desperate for medical attention who 
never receive such care illustrate the unacceptable current state of health 
care for immigrants in detention. 
II. HEALTH LAW AS A MODEL FOR CHANGE 
The previous Part identified serious concerns with immigration detain-
ees’ access to health examinations, medical treatments, infection controls, 
and suicide precautions.201 Thus far, proposals to improve health care in 
detention have relied primarily on constitutional prohibitions against pun-
ishment without due process of law,202 international documents establishing 
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rights to health care,203 international human rights prohibitions against cru-
el, inhumane, and degrading treatment,204 and reasonable care obligations 
under tort law.205 Although supportive of these proposals, this Part argues 
that constitutional law, international human rights law, and tort law lack the 
specificity, enforceability, and ex ante direction necessary, respectively, to 
effect comprehensive, nationwide detainee health reform. 
As background, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment pro-
tects any person in custody of the United States from conditions that consti-
tute punishment without due process of law.206 Some detainees argue that 
the failure of detention officials to provide adequate health care inflicts un-
necessary pain and suffering; that is, punishment without due process of 
law.207 Various standards exist for evaluating such claims. Some courts re-
quire a showing that detention officials acted with “deliberate indifference” 
to a detainee’s “serious medical need.”208 Other courts only require a show-
ing that detention officials failed to provide “reasonable medical care” for a 
“serious medical need” and that such failure was not “reasonably related to 
a legitimate governmental objective.”209 
                                                                                                                           
if a detaineeʼs medical needs are treated with deliberate indifference by officers or doctors, it is a 
violation of the detainee[’s] due process.”). 
 203 See, e.g., Skinner, supra note 19, at 272, 293–94 (identifying rights to physical and mental 
health care set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Econom-
ic, Social, and Cultural Rights; concluding that the United States is in violation of its obligations 
to refugees under international law); SEATTLE CLINIC REPORT, supra note 202, at 47–48 (“Inade-
quate access to medical care is a violation of the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights] and the 
minimum standards of the UN Principles for Detained Persons.”). 
 204 See, e.g., Hamell, supra note 20, at 253 (discussing international human rights’ prohibi-
tions against cruel and inhuman treatment in the context of pregnant, laboring, and delivering 
detainees); Skinner, supra note 19, at 283–84, 290–91 (discussing the prohibitions against cruel, 
inhumane, and degrading treatment in international human rights provisions in the context of de-
tainees’ lack of access to physical and mental health care); MIDWEST COAL. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
& LEGAL CLINIC OF THE UNIV. OF IOWA COLL. OF LAW, MIDWEST REGIONAL REPORT ON TOR-
TURE AND CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT 3 (2014), http://www.ushrnetwork.
org/sites/ushrnetwork.org/files/02-general-mwc.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ZSM-WEJ7] (“The United 
States subjects individuals . . . to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. This report focuses on 
the American Midwest, where . . . detained immigrants are routinely . . . denied adequate medical 
care.”). 
 205 See, e.g., Improving Carceral Conditions, supra note 21, at 1491–97 (considering claims 
against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act as a means of improving car-
ceral conditions of immigrant detainees). 
 206 See, e.g., Cesar v. Achim, 542 F. Supp. 2d 897, 908 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (holding that immi-
gration detainee stated a due process claim for denial of health care). 
 207 See, e.g., Woods Complaint, supra note 49, at 43 (asserting that failure to provide adequate 
health care to detainees is not reasonably related to any legitimate government objective and is de 
facto punishment without due process of law). 
 208 See, e.g., Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001); Cesar, 542 F. Supp. 2d 
at 907. 
 209 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979) (“[I]f a restriction or condition is not 
reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may 
2016] Improving the Health of Immigration Detainees 191 
These constitutional principles have provided legal relief for some de-
tainees. In Woods v. Myers, a 2007 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, for 
example, detainees at SDCF, which is owned and operated by the for-profit 
Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”), sued ICE, SDCF, and CCA, 
as well as individual representatives thereof, arguing that the defendants 
failed to provide the detainees adequate health care, that such failure was 
not reasonably related to any legitimate governmental objective, and that 
such failure constituted de facto punishment in violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.210 The defendants ultimately settled, pro-
spectively agreeing to provide constitutionally adequate physical and men-
tal health care to detainees at SDCF.211 
Other than a handful of cases in which individual detainees have suc-
cessfully employed constitutional principles to challenge their lack of ade-
quate health care while in detention,212 constitutional law has done little to 
effect comprehensive, nationwide detainee health reform. One reason is that 
constitutional standards tend towards broad ex post policies.213 That is, after 
a detainee becomes sick or dies, the detainee (or his or her legal representa-
tive) retrospectively argues that the detention center’s failure to provide ad-
equate health care caused avoidable pain, suffering, deterioration of health, 
and/or death; that is, punishment without due process of law.214 This consti-
tutional standard certainly provides some guidance to judges presiding over 
cases in which individual detainees or groups of detainees retrospectively 
argue that their due process rights have been violated, but this standard does 
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little to prospectively guide detention medical staff in their future treatment 
of detainees. Stated slightly differently, constitutional law does little ex ante 
to instruct detention officials with respect to the creation and implementa-
tions of specific policies and procedures that will improve the health and 
safety of immigration detainees. 
In addition to constitutional law, proposals to improve health care in 
detention also have relied on international documents establishing rights to 
health and prohibitions against cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. 
For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides human 
beings a “right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being 
of himself and of his family, including . . . medical care.”215 By further ex-
ample, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
provides a “right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health,” including the “creation of condi-
tions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the 
event of sickness.”216 Neither of these documents is binding or enforceable 
on the United States, however.217 As such, their power to achieve broad 
health reform in U.S. detention centers is limited. 
In addition to unenforceable international rights to health care, interna-
tional human rights documents also establish negative rights against torture 
and other forms of poor treatment. The Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), for 
example, prohibits treatment that rises to the level of torture as well as other 
forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (“CIDT”).218 Nevertheless, 
CAT narrowly defines torture as an intentional act inflicted by or with the 
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amnestyusa.org/pdfs/escr_qa.pdf [http://perma.cc/E39G-9GVN] (explaining that the United States 
signed the Covenant in 1979 but did not ratify it and therefore is not bound by it). 
 218 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT] (pro-
hibiting torture and other CIDT). 
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consent of a public official.219 The element of intent, in particular, limits the 
acts that can constitute torture and implicate CAT’s prohibitions.220 In addi-
tion, the United States conditioned its ratification of CAT’s prohibition 
against CIDT “only insofar as [CIDT] . . . means the cruel, unusual and in-
humane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or 
Fourteenth Amendments.”221 Enforceable international prohibitions against 
torture and CIDT thus circle back to the same constitutional law limitations 
described above. 
A third proposed basis of detention reform is tort law.222 Under princi-
ples of negligence, physicians who provide health care to detainees have a 
duty to act like reasonably prudent physicians under the same or similar 
circumstances.223 Although a handful of detainees have successfully used 
tort law to obtain monetary damages for negligent diagnosis and treatment 
by detention medical staff,224 it is also not clear that tort law provides suffi-
                                                                                                                           
 219 See id. art. 1 (defining torture to include “any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for [certain] purposes . . . when 
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of 
a public official”; clarifying that “[torture] does not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions”). 
 220 See, e.g., Gail H. Miller, Defining Torture 5–21 (Floersheimer Center Occasional Papers, 
Paper No. 3, 2005), http://cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/Defining%20Torture.pdf [http://perma.
cc/M3N4-BV3K]. As one scholar explained, 
In other words, were a victim to suffer severe pain at the hands of a state official, but 
the official did not intend to cause the severe pain, the act would not amount to tor-
ture. This might be the case if, for example, a prisoner experienced severe pain or 
suffering as a result of poor prison conditions but the officials did not intend the 
conditions to affect the prisoner so severely. 
Id. 
 221 CAT, supra note 218, at 65, ¶ 302. See generally MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, THE U.N. 
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: OVERVIEW OF U.S. IMPLEMENTATION POLICY CONCERNING 
THE REMOVAL OF ALIENS 2 (2004), reprinted in JENNIFER K. ELSEA ET AL., THE TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS: LEGAL, MORAL OR CRIMINAL? 225, 225 (Ralph D. McPhee ed., 2006) (“The United 
States ratified the [CAT], subject to certain declarations, reservations, and understandings, includ-
ing that the Convention was not self-executing, and therefore required domestic implementing 
legislation to take effect.”). 
 222 See, e.g., Improving Carceral Conditions, supra note 21, at 1491–97 (proposing the classi-
fication of nonfederal prison facilities as agents of the federal government under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act as “the most viable approach to ameliorating the carceral conditions of federal immi-
grant detainees”). 
 223 See, e.g., Banderas Findings, supra note 108, at 8 (“A physician is negligent if he or she 
fails to use the level of skill, knowledge, and care in diagnosis and treatment that other reasonably 
careful physicians would use in the same or similar circumstances.”). 
 224 See, e.g., id. at 11 (awarding a San Diego Correctional Facility detainee $250,000 for med-
ical negligence); Hernandez-Gonzalez Complaint, supra note 63, at 7–8 (alleging that the gov-
ernment’s failure to provide adequate health care to Medina-Martinez breached the standard of 
care and was negligent); Redmon, supra note 61 (discussing the Medina-Martinez case and noting 
that the parties settled for an undisclosed sum). 
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cient ex ante direction to detention officials regarding what they should be 
doing with respect to the examination, diagnosis, and treatment of detain-
ees, so it would not lead to sufficient systemic change. In summary, consti-
tutional law, international human rights law, and tort law provide some legal 
relief for injured detainees. These laws do not, however, provide specific 
guidance to detention staff regarding the steps necessary to maintain detain-
ee health and safety. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of constitutional law, international 
human rights law, and tort law, other state and federal laws do provide sub-
stantively adequate and legally enforceable health and safety standards that 
may serve as reference points for assessing the health care provided in de-
tention. In particular, state laws governing involuntary commitment,225 fed-
eral laws applicable to long-term care facilities, including Medicare-
participating skilled nursing facilities and Medicaid-participating nursing 
facilities,226 and federal and state behavioral health laws227 contain detailed 
health and safety requirements that are designed to protect vulnerable pa-
tients in a variety of institutional contexts. As explained in more detail be-
low, these reference laws require prompt physical and mental health exami-
nations; the creation, formal documentation, and implementation of indi-
vidualized care plans; appropriate treatment, including regular follow-up; 
comprehensive infection controls; and rigorous suicide precautions and 
monitoring. Importantly, these laws are associated with health care quality 
improvements in both voluntary and involuntary health care settings.228 
A. Involuntary Commitment Laws 
Each state as well as the District of Columbia has a law governing the 
involuntary commitment of certain individuals with severe mental illness to 
the inpatient hospital setting.229 In addition, forty-five states as well as the 
                                                                                                                           
 225 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 574.034(a), 574.035(a) (West 2014) 
(setting forth standards for temporary and extended involuntary inpatient commitment under Tex-
as law); id. §§ 574.034(b), 574.035(b) (setting forth standards for temporary and extended invol-
untary outpatient commitment under Texas law). 
 226 See 42 C.F.R. pt. 483 (2014) (establishing federal requirements for long-term care facili-
ties); id. § 483.1(b) (“The provisions of this part contain the requirements that an institution must 
meet in order to qualify to participate as a SNF [skilled nursing facility] in the Medicare program, 
and as a nursing facility in the Medicaid program.”). 
 227 See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.60–.62 (2014) (establishing the Medicare Conditions of Partic-
ipation for Psychiatric Hospitals); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 432-101 (2014) (regulating psychiatric 
hospitals in Utah). 
 228 See, e.g., supra notes 265, 299 and accompanying text. 
 229 See, e.g., VA. CODE. ANN. § 37.2-817(C) (West 2014) (setting forth the standard for in-
voluntary inpatient commitment under Virginia law); TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., STATE 
STANDARDS FOR ASSISTED TREATMENT: CIVIL COMMITMENT CRITERIA FOR INPATIENT OR OUT-
PATIENT PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 2 (2014), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/
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District of Columbia have laws authorizing the involuntary provision of 
community-based, outpatient treatment.230 Collectively, this Article refers to 
these two types of laws as involuntary commitment laws.231 Although some 
generalizations regarding involuntary commitment laws may be made, each 
state uses distinct terminology and has distinct thresholds for inpatient and, 
if applicable, outpatient commitment.232 As such, state law must be consult-
ed to address particular commitment questions. 
Alabama, for example, has both inpatient and outpatient commitment 
laws. Alabama’s involuntary inpatient commitment law provides that an 
individual may be committed for inpatient treatment233 if clear and convinc-
ing evidence is presented to the probate court showing that the individual: 
(1) has a mental illness;234 (2) “as a result of the mental illness . . . poses a 
real and present threat of substantial harm to self and/or others”; (3) “will, if 
not treated, continue to suffer mental distress and will continue to experi-
ence deterioration of the ability to function independently”; and (4) “is una-
ble to make a rational and informed decision as to whether or not treatment 
for mental illness would be desirable.”235 
Alabama’s threshold for involuntary outpatient commitment is similar, 
except there is no requirement that the individual “pose[] a real and present 
threat of substantial harm to self and/or others.”236 That is, a court may or-
der outpatient treatment237 for an individual if clear and convincing evi-
                                                                                                                           
documents/Standards_-_The_Text-_June_2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/C7JH-ZC2K] [hereinafter 
STATE STANDARDS FOR ASSISTED TREATMENT] (explaining that each state has an involuntary 
inpatient commitment law). 
 230 VA. CODE. ANN. § 37.2-817(D) (setting forth the standard for involuntary outpatient com-
mitment under Virginia law); BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, INVOLUNTARY OUTPA-
TIENT COMMITMENT: SUMMARY OF STATE STATUTES 2–35 (2000), http://www.bazelon.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CBmFgyA4i-w%3D&tabid=324 [http://perma.cc/UX3E-6W6C] (summa-
rizing involuntary outpatient commitment laws). 
 231 See, e.g., ALA. CODE. § 22-52-1.1(9) (2014) (defining involuntary commitment as “[c]ourt 
ordered mental health services in either an outpatient or inpatient setting”). 
 232 STATE STANDARDS FOR ASSISTED TREATMENT, supra note 229, at 2 (“Each state law is 
distinct from the others, utilizing its own terminology and standards.”). 
 233 See ALA. CODE. § 22-52-1.1(6) (defining inpatient treatment as “[t]reatment being provid-
ed to a person at a state mental health facility or a designated mental health facility which has been 
specifically designated by the department for inpatient treatment”). 
 234 See id. § 22-52-1.1(1) (defining mental illness as “[a] psychiatric disorder of thought 
and/or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or 
ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life”). 
 235 Id. § 22-52-10.4(a). See generally Sara Gordon, The Danger Zone: How the Dangerous-
ness Standard in Civil Commitment Proceedings Harms People with Serious Mental Illness, CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (critiquing the dangerousness criterion set forth in many state 
involuntary commitment laws). 
 236 See infra note 238 and accompanying text (describing Alabama’s threshold standard for 
involuntary outpatient commitments). 
 237 See ALA. CODE § 22-52-1.1(5) (defining outpatient treatment as “[t]reatment being pro-
vided to a person in a nonresidential setting and who is not admitted for 24-hour-a-day care”). 
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dence is presented to the probate court showing that the individual: (1) has a 
mental illness; (2) “as a result of the mental illness will . . . if not treated, 
continue to suffer mental distress and will continue to experience deteriora-
tion of the ability to function independently”; and (3) “is unable to make a 
rational and informed decision as to whether or not treatment for mental 
illness would be desirable.”238 
Through their involuntary commitment laws, states recognize that both 
temporarily held239 and fully committed individuals may have underlying 
physical and mental health conditions that require immediate as well as 
long-term treatment. As such, all states require the provision of an initial 
health examination within hours of an emergency hold or the filing of a 
formal petition for commitment to determine whether commitment may be 
appropriate.240 In Texas, for example, a physician shall examine an individ-
ual who is detained on an emergency basis “as soon as possible within 12 
hours after the time the person is apprehended by the peace officer or trans-
ported for emergency detention by the person’s guardian.”241 
The State of Washington has similar examination requirements for in-
dividuals once they are committed. That is, individuals who receive services 
from the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services and 
are involuntarily committed must receive timely evaluations after admission 
to determine the nature of their health conditions as well as needed medical 
treatments.242 Under Washington law, these mandatory evaluations include: 
(1) a physical health examination conducted within twenty-four hours of 
admission to a treatment facility by a licensed physician, advanced regis-
tered nurse practitioner, or physician assistant; and (2) a psychosocial eval-
uation by a mental health professional.243 The psychosocial evaluation must 
                                                                                                                           
 238 Id. § 22-52-10.2. 
 239 Most involuntary commitment laws contain provisions authorizing an individual to be 
temporarily held on an emergency basis, usually for forty-eight or seventy-two hours, during 
which time a preliminary health examination is performed to determine whether commitment 
might be appropriate and/or during which time a person may file a formal commitment petition. 
See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150(a) (West 2014) (“When a person, as a result of a 
mental health disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled . . . the 
person [may be taken] into custody for a period of up to 72 hours . . . .”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 573.021(b) (West 2014) (“A person accepted for a preliminary examination may be de-
tained in custody for not longer than 48 hours after the time the person is presented to the facility 
unless a written order for protective custody is obtained.”). See generally TREATMENT ADVOCACY 
CTR., EMERGENCY HOSPITALIZATION FOR EVALUATION: ASSISTED PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 
STANDARDS BY STATE 1–13 (2014), http://treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/
Emergency_Hospitalization_for_Evaluation.pdf [http://perma.cc/BL62-KN5V] (referencing each 
state’s statutory provisions for emergency hospitalization). 
 240 See, e.g., infra notes 241–244 and accompanying text. 
 241 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 573.021(c). 
 242 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-865-0541 (2014). 
 243 Id. § 388-865-0541(2)(a)–(c). 
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occur within three hours of arrival if the individual is an adult or twelve 
hours of arrival if the individual is a child who is being placed in an inpa-
tient facility.244 Based on the findings of these physical and mental health 
examinations, as well as appropriate diagnostic testing,245 Washington law 
requires the individual to be provided treatment in accordance with a de-
tailed and formally documented plan of care.246 The plan of care must be 
developed collaboratively with the individual, his or her support system, 
and a multidisciplinary team that includes mental health specialists.247 Close 
follow up also is required. Indeed, a mental health professional must ob-
serve and evaluate each individual committed for treatment in the State of 
Washington once a day for the duration of the commitment.248 
Other states’ involuntary commitment laws also require prompt physical 
and mental health examinations, appropriate treatment in accordance with 
detailed, documented plans of care, and close patient follow up. In North 
Carolina, for example, an individual who is the subject of a commitment peti-
tion must undergo several examinations. The first examination must be con-
ducted by a physician or psychologist “as soon as possible, and in any event 
within 24 hours” after the individual is taken into custody by local law en-
forcement.249 If, during the first examination, the individual is preliminarily 
determined to meet the threshold for commitment, the individual is transport-
ed to a treatment facility and examined for a second time.250 North Carolina 
requires the second examination to be conducted by a physician other than the 
physician who may have completed the first examination and to occur within 
twenty-four hours of the individual’s arrival at the facility.251 If the second 
examiner finds that the individual meets the threshold for inpatient or outpa-
tient commitment, the law specifically authorizes a physician to administer 
the individual “reasonable and appropriate medication and treatment that are 
consistent with accepted medical standards.”252 
Rhode Island also clarifies that involuntarily committed individuals 
have a legal right to receive treatment for their health conditions.253 That is, 
individuals involuntarily committed in Rhode Island have the “right to re-
ceive the care and treatment that is necessary for and appropriate to the 
                                                                                                                           
 244 Id. § 388-865-0541(3)(a)–(b). 
 245 Id. § 388-865-0547(1). 
 246 Id. § 388-865-0547(2). 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. § 388-865-0547(6). 
 249 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 122C-263(a), (c) (West 2014). 
 250 Id. § 122C-266(a). 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. § 122C-266(d). 
 253 See infra notes 254–257 and accompanying text (describing Rhode Island statutes pertain-
ing to involuntary commitment). 
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condition for which he or she was admitted or certified and from which he 
or she can reasonably be expected to benefit.”254 Involuntarily committed 
individuals also have the right to an individualized treatment plan that shall 
be developed by appropriate mental health professionals, including a psy-
chiatrist.255 Rhode Island requires each individual’s treatment plan not only 
to be developed, but also implemented, within five days of the individual’s 
involuntary court certification.256 Acceptable treatment plans must contain 
statements or descriptions, as appropriate, of: (1) “the nature of the specific 
problems and specific needs of the [individual]”; (2) “the least restrictive 
treatment conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of certification or 
admission”; (3) “intermediate and long-range treatment goals”; and (4) “the 
plan of treatment for achieving these intermediate and long-range goals,” 
including rationales therefor.257 
Finally, many involuntary commitment laws set forth a range of other 
health care-related statutory rights for committed individuals including, but 
not limited to, the right to be visited privately at reasonable times by a per-
sonal physician, the right to obtain an independent psychiatric evaluation 
and opinion from a psychiatrist or other mental health professional of the 
individual’s choice, the right to have the least possible restraint consistent 
with the health care and treatment necessary for the individual’s health con-
dition, and the right to access a mental health advocate upon request.258 
The right of involuntarily committed individuals to receive health care 
is not just statutory, but constitutional. In Wyatt v. Stickney, a seminal case 
decided in 1971 that addresses the constitutional rights of individuals invol-
untarily committed to a state mental hospital, the U.S. District Court for the 
Middle District of Alabama held that such individuals “unquestionably have 
a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give each 
of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental 
health condition.”259 The court explained that “adequate and effective 
treatment is constitutionally required because, absent treatment, the hospital 
is transformed into a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for 
no convicted offense.”260 The court also stated that a lack of funding for 
staff or facilities cannot be used as an excuse for a lack of adequate health 
care: “The failure to provide suitable and adequate treatment to the mentally 
                                                                                                                           
 254 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-9(a) (2014). 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. § 40.1-5-9(a)(1)–(4). 
 258 See, e.g., id. § 40.1-5-5(f)(5), (8), (12)–(13). 
 259 Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff’d sub nom. Wyatt v. Ader-
holt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 260 Id. 
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ill cannot be justified by lack of staff or facilities.”261 The court concluded 
by emphasizing involuntary health care providers’ legal and moral obliga-
tions to their court-ordered patients: 
There can be no legal (or moral) justification for the State of Ala-
bama’s failing to afford treatment—and adequate treatment from a 
medical standpoint—to the several thousand patients who have 
been who have been civilly committed . . . . To deprive any citizen 
of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement 
is for humane therapeutic purposes and then fail to provide ade-
quate treatment violates the very fundamental of due process.262 
In Wyatt, the court ultimately ordered the defendant hospital to prepare a 
specific plan for providing “appropriate and adequate treatment to pa-
tients.”263 Circuit courts across the country have agreed with the constitu-
tional rights first identified in Wyatt, calling them the “Wyatt standards.”264 
Researchers also have associated the Wyatt standards with health care quali-
ty improvements in Alabama’s mental hospitals.265 
In summary, state involuntary commitment laws contain stringent and 
enforceable standards regarding health examinations, plans of care, and initial 
treatment as well as follow-up care. Individuals who are involuntarily com-
mitted also have constitutional rights to adequate, or reasonable, health care. 
Why might these statutory and constitutional rights serve as a refer-
ence point for assessing the health care, or lack thereof, provided to immi-
gration detainees? Several reasons exist. First, involuntary commitment and 
immigration detention are both government-authorized forms of civil con-
finement. Involuntary commitment is a state-authorized, civil measure de-
signed to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of individuals who have a 
mental illness and might be a danger to themselves or others and/or who 
meet other criteria.266 Indeed, state legislatures frequently title their involun-
                                                                                                                           
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. at 785. 
 263 Id. at 785–86. 
 264 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Rogers, 92 F.3d 1074, 1077 (11th Cir. 1996) (referencing the “Wyatt 
standards”); Walters v. W. St. Hosp., 864 F.2d 695, 700 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Wyatt for its con-
stitutional right to adequate treatment); Deborah J. Belcher, Wyatt v. Stickney, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ALA. (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-2375 [http://perma.cc/RB
6Q-73ZM] (“These standards, later referred to as the Wyatt Standards, rested on three principles: 
individualized treatment plans, qualified staff in numbers sufficient to administer adequate treat-
ment, and humane psychological and least restrictive environments.”). 
 265 See, e.g., Philip J. Leaf, Wyatt v. Stickney: Assessing the Impact in Alabama, 28 HOSP. & 
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 351, 351 (1977) (“[The Wyatt standards] may have contributed signifi-
cantly to the improvements that have occurred in mental health care in Alabama after Wyatt.”). 
 266 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4(k)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2014) (allowing an individual’s 
involuntary commitment if the circuit court or mental hygiene commissioner makes a finding that 
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tary commitment laws “civil commitment” laws267 and carefully distinguish 
these civil commitment laws from their criminal counterparts, even to the 
point of prohibiting evidence obtained during a civil commitment from be-
ing used in a criminal conviction.268 
Immigration detention also is a civil, not criminal, form of detention.269 
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that unlawful presence in the 
United States does not itself constitute a federal crime, although it can trig-
ger the civil remedy of removal,270 that immigration detention is a form of 
civil, not criminal, detention,271 and that deportation proceedings are purely 
civil actions that are not designed to punish past transgressions.272 
In addition, both involuntary commitment and immigration detention 
have as one of their stated purposes the protection of the public. Indeed, one 
of the thresholds for involuntary inpatient commitment in every state is the 
                                                                                                                           
the individual has a mental illness or addiction and, because of that mental illness or addiction, is 
likely to cause serious harm to self or others if allowed to remain at liberty, among other require-
ments). 
 267 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5585 (West 2014) (California Act titled the “Chil-
dren’s Civil Commitment and Mental Health Treatment Act”); MINN. STAT. ch. 253B (2014) 
(Minnesota Statutes chapter titled “Civil Commitment”). 
 268 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.340 (West 2014) (“The determination of alcohol-
ism or drug addiction and civil commitment . . . shall not be deemed a criminal conviction.”); id. 
§ 458A.250 (“The determination of problem gambling and civil commitment . . . shall not be 
deemed a criminal conviction.”); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 664 (2014) (“The determination of 
narcotic addiction and the subsequent civil commitment . . . shall not be deemed a criminal con-
viction. The results of any tests or procedures . . . may only be used in a [civil commitment] pro-
ceeding [and] not be used . . . in any criminal proceeding . . . .”). 
 269 See, e.g., Kristen C. Ochoa et al., Disparities in Justice and Care, Persons with Severe 
Mental Illness in the U.S. Immigration Detention System, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 392, 
393 (2010). As one group of scholars explains, 
The United States immigration detention system is civil and subjects immigrants to 
detention for the primary purpose of preventing their absconding from civil deporta-
tion proceedings, not to punish or rehabilitate. Its function stands in contrast to the 
criminal justice system, which utilizes detention and incarceration, not only to pre-
vent flight during the pendency of the criminal process, but also to punish and reha-
bilitate those convicted of crimes. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 270 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012) (citing Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984), for the principle that “[i]t is 
not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States”). 
 271 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“The proceedings at issue here are 
civil, not criminal, and we assume that they are non-punitive in purpose and effect.”). But see 
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 
1346, 1353 (2014) (“Despite the consistent description of immigration confinement as civil, the 
Court has never explicitly rationalized this determination.”). 
 272 See, e.g., Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038–39 (“A deportation proceeding is a purely 
civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country . . . . [A] deportation hearing is in-
tended to provide a streamlined determination of eligibility to remain in this country, nothing 
more. The purpose of deportation is not to punish past transgressions . . . .”). 
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potential danger to others of an individual with severe mental illness.273 
Likewise, the federal courts and ICE have repeatedly stated that one pur-
pose of immigration detention is to protect the public.274 In its 2003 opinion 
in Demore v. Kim, the U.S. Supreme Court examined in detail the govern-
ment’s two principal justifications for mandatory detention, including pro-
tection of the public from allegedly dangerous aliens.275 The Director of 
ICE also stated in 2011 that individuals who pose a “risk to public safety” 
are a top priority in terms of immigration apprehension, detention, and re-
moval.276 In its 2003 opinion in Sylvain v. Attorney General of the United 
States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit further explained 
that, “The [mandatory detention] statute promotes the public interest by 
keeping the most dangerous aliens off the streets . . . . The sooner they de-
tain dangerous aliens, the safer the public will be.”277 
In addition to their shared civil nature and goal of protecting the pub-
lic, involuntary commitment and immigration detention have other similari-
ties. For example, individuals in both groups are unable to access the health 
care they need, although for very different reasons. On the commitment 
side, the inability of individuals who need to be committed to access health 
care is reflected in the standard for involuntary commitment in each state. 
Alabama requires the subject of a commitment petition to be “unable to 
make a rational and informed decision as to whether or not treatment for 
mental illness would be desirable.”278 Idaho similarly requires the subject to 
“lack insight into his need for treatment and [be] unable or unwilling to 
                                                                                                                           
 273 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5011(a) (2014) (“An individual shall be involuntarily 
committed for inpatient treatment only if . . . (1) The individual is a person with a mental condi-
tion; (2) Based upon manifest indications, the individual is . . . [d]angerous to others . . . .”); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. 135-C:34 (2014) (“The standard to be used . . . in determining whether a person 
should be . . . treat[ed] . . . on an involuntary basis shall be whether the person is in such mental 
condition as a result of mental illness as to create a potentially serious likelihood of danger . . . to 
others.”); STATE STANDARDS FOR ASSISTED TREATMENT, supra note 229, at 2–89 (referencing 
each state’s involuntary inpatient commitment standard, almost all of which allow commitment 
when an individual with a mental illness is a danger to others and meets certain other criteria); 
Gordon, supra note 235, at 13 (explaining that states began, in the 1950s, to shift away from a 
“need for treatment” standard to a “dangerousness to self or others” standard). 
 274 See infra notes 275–277 and accompanying text. 
 275 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518–22 (2003) (discussing the justifications of flight risk 
and danger to community); id. at 531 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he justification for 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c) is based upon the Government’s concerns over the risks of flight and danger to the 
community . . . .”). 
 276 See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to 
All ICE Employees 1 (Mar. 2, 2011) (including within the first priority “[a]liens who pose a . . . 
risk to public safety”). 
 277 Sylvain v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 714 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 278 ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.2(iii) (one of three criteria for involuntary outpatient commitment); 
id. § 22-52-10.4(a)(iv) (one of four criteria for involuntary inpatient commitment). 
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comply with treatment.”279 Florida also requires the subject to have “refused 
voluntary placement for treatment after sufficient and conscientious expla-
nation and disclosure of the purpose of placement for treatment” or to be 
“unable to determine for himself or herself whether placement is neces-
sary.”280 And, once committed, these individuals have no way to access 
health care outside the hospitals or other treatment facilities into which they 
have been court ordered. 
On the detention side, the stories shared in Part I illustrate that detainees, 
including detainees whose health conditions were successfully managed prior 
to detention, frequently rely on detention center staff to access health care or 
continue their treatments once detained. Remember, for example, Nery 
Romero, the twenty-two-year-old Salvadoran national whose pain for his 
shattered broken leg had been medically managed prior to detention but 
whose pain medications were discontinued upon detention.281 Federal inves-
tigators later found Romero’s untreated pain to be a factor in his suicide.282 
Other individuals’ medically necessary treatments also have been discontin-
ued upon detention. At Irwin County Detention Center, a new detainee with 
only three months of chemotherapy remaining in her plan of care was una-
ble to continue her life-saving treatments.283 At the time of intake, Irwin 
staff did administer the detainee a test for tuberculosis, but the detainee was 
unable to see a physician for over one week even after sharing her cancer 
diagnosis and requesting treatment.284 When the detainee finally was seen, 
the physician gave her over-the-counter pain medication but would not or-
der a radiological examination to monitor the progress of her cancer or con-
tinue her chemotherapy treatments.285 
These examples show that individuals, once detained, lose their ability 
to obtain adequate health care if their detention centers fail to provide such 
care. In the criminal setting, the U.S. Supreme Court has used this reason to 
identify a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 
cases involving a prison’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious 
medical needs: “[The] government [has an] obligation to provide medical 
care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration. An inmate must rely 
on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do 
                                                                                                                           
 279 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-317(11)(c) (2014); id. § 66-329(11). 
 280 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1)(a)(1)(a)–(b) (West 2014). 
 281 Bernstein, Suicide, supra note 193; see supra notes 30–200 (presenting accounts of indi-
viduals who suffered from preventable illnesses yet were unable to receive treatment while in 
detention). 
 282 Bernstein, Officials Hid Truth, supra note 129; Bernstein, Officials Obscured Truth, supra 
note 202. 
 283 IRWIN COUNTY DETENTION CENTER REPORT, supra note 88, at 3. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
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so, those needs will not be met.”286 The Court further explained, “This is 
true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their re-
sponse to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying 
or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the 
treatment once prescribed.”287 
In the context of civil immigration detention, detainees also have a 
right to necessary medical care, but this right derives from the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment.288 When im-
migration officials have denied detainees medically necessary treatments 
they were receiving prior to detention, detainees’ due process claims may 
be allowed to proceed in court.289 
B. Long-Term Care Requirements 
In addition to state involuntary commitment laws, a second possible 
reference point for assessing the quality of health care provided to immigra-
tion detainees is a federal rule applicable to long-term care facilities, includ-
ing Medicare-participating skilled nursing facilities and Medicaid-
participating nursing facilities.290 
As background, Medicare-participating skilled nursing facilities (“SNFs”) 
are institutions that: (1) primarily provide to Medicare beneficiaries and other 
individuals skilled nursing care or rehabilitation services; (2) do not primarily 
care for and treat mental disorders; and (3) must adhere to stringent require-
                                                                                                                           
 286 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (“[D]eliberate indifference to serious 
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . pro-
scribed by the Eighth Amendment.” (citation omitted)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Ex-
cessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”). 
 287 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Some state statutes affirmatively require criminal defendants 
adjudicated guilty but mentally ill to be provided mental health care. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. 
ANN. § 12.47.050(b) (West 2014). Alaska, for example, requires its Department of Corrections to 
“provide mental health treatment to a defendant found guilty but mentally ill . . . until the defend-
ant no longer suffers from a mental disease or defect that causes the defendant to be dangerous to 
the public peace or safety.” Id. 
 288 See, e.g., Adekoya v. Holder, 751 F. Supp. 2d 688, 694–95 & n.4 (“Because [the plaintiff] 
was in civil immigration detention rather than criminal detention, his deliberate indifference 
claims should be analyzed under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause rather than the Eighth 
Amendment’s ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ clause.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No 
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 289 See, e.g., Cesar, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 906–08 (holding that detainee stated a Fifth Amend-
ment due process claim against detention official for denial of medical care when: (1) detainee 
was successfully managing a number of medical conditions, including hypertension, depression, 
diabetes, arthritis, back pain, acid reflux, and Grave’s disease, with prescription medications prior 
to detention; and (2) officials would not give the detainee these medications in detention). 
 290 See 42 C.F.R. § 483.1(b) (2015). 
204 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:167 
ments designed to ensure the health and safety of residents.291 For example, 
SNFs must care for their residents in a way that will at least maintain, if not 
enhance, the quality of life of each resident.292 By further example, SNFs 
“must provide services to attain or maintain the highest practicable physi-
cal, mental, and psychosocial well-being of each resident.”293 
SNFs are legally distinct from Medicaid-participating nursing facilities 
(“NFs”), which are institutions that: (1) primarily provide to Medicaid ben-
eficiaries and other individuals skilled nursing care, rehabilitation services 
or, on a regular basis, health-related care and services above the level of 
room-and-board services that can only be made available through an institu-
tional facility; (2) do not primarily care for and treat mental disorders; and 
(3) must adhere to stringent requirements designed to ensure the health and 
safety of residents.294 One of these requirements is that the NF must care for 
its residents in a way that will at least maintain, if not enhance, the quality 
of life of each resident.295 A second requirement is that the NF “must pro-
vide services and activities to attain or maintain the highest practicable 
physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being of each resident.”296 
Collectively referred to as long-term care (“LTC”) facilities, SNFs and 
NFs are jointly regulated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(“CMS”) through federal regulations first promulgated in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s during a period of federal LTC reform.297 Following the promul-
                                                                                                                           
 291 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(a)(1)–(3) (2012). 
 292 Id. § 1395i-3(b)(1)(A). 
 293 Id. § 1395i-3(b)(2). 
 294 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a)(1)–(3) (2012). Although SNFs and NFs have different legal defini-
tions, 95% of LTC facilities in the United States are certified as both SNFs and NFs; “[t]hat is, 
they provide both the Medicare SNF benefit, and the Medicaid NF benefit.” See Medicare and 
Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,168, 
42,177 (proposed July 16, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 483) [hereinafter LTC Proposed 
Rule]. 
 295 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 296 Id. § 1396r(b)(2). 
 297 A number of studies published in the mid-1980s reported the widespread abuse, neglect, and 
inadequate medical treatment of residents in LTC facilities. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., IMPROVING THE 
QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES 21 (1986), https://iom.nationalacademies.org/Reports/
1986/Improving-the-Quality-of-Care-in-Nursing-Homes.aspx [http://perma.cc/L8Q9-S5D6] (“Quali-
ty of care and quality of life in many nursing homes are not satisfactory.”). In response, the Institute 
of Medicine (“IOM”) recommended to Congress a “major reorientation” of the regulation of LTC 
facilities in order to improve the health, safety, and welfare of LTC residents. Id. at 22. The IOM’s 
recommendations included an overhaul of the federal regulations governing the quality of care pro-
vided by LTC facilities, stringent surveillance of LTC facilities, and rigorous enforcement policies 
and procedures. Id. Congress agreed with the IOM’s recommendations, passing in 1987 the Nursing 
Home Reform Act (“NHRA”). Nursing Home Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4201–18, 101 
Stat. 1330-175, 1330-179, 1330-182 (1987) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(a)–(h), 
1396r(a)–(h)). In 1989 and 1991, the Federal Department of Health and Human Services promulgat-
ed final regulations implementing the NHRA. See Medicare and Medicaid; Requirements for Long 
Term Care Facilities, 54 Fed. Reg. 5316 (Feb. 2, 1989) (codified as amended at 42 C.F.R. pt. 483); 
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gation of these regulations (collectively, the LTC requirements),298 research-
ers reported quality improvements in LTC facilities across the country, sug-
gesting that such improvements were due to the requirements’ stringent quali-
ty and staffing provisions.299 As discussed in more detail below, the LTC re-
quirements may serve as a useful reference point for assessing possible deten-
tion health reform.300 
As background, the LTC requirements establish minimum standards 
designed to ensure the health and safety of each individual, called a resi-
dent, admitted to an LTC facility.301 Promptly upon admission to an LTC 
facility,302 for example, each resident must be comprehensively assessed 
with respect to cognition, communication, vision, mood and behavior, psy-
chosocial well-being, physical functioning, continence, disease diagnosis, 
dental and nutritional status, skin condition, activity pursuit, and medica-
tions.303 Recognizing the importance of these assessments for identifying 
each resident’s health care needs and establishing a plan of care, the Secre-
tary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has the authority 
to impose civil money penalties on individuals who knowingly and willfully 
fail to conduct an assessment or who make a material and false statement as 
part of an assessment.304 
Following each assessment, LTC facilities are required to develop a 
comprehensive care plan for each resident that includes measurable goals 
and objectives designed to meet the resident’s physical and mental health 
care needs.305 Each care plan must identify, among other goals and objec-
tives, the services the resident needs in order to “attain or maintain” his or 
                                                                                                                           
see also Medicare and Medicaid; Requirements for Long Term Care Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 48,867 
(Sept. 26, 1991) (codified as amended at 42 C.F.R. pt. 483) (revising final regulations). The LTC 
requirements promulgated through these two regulations, along with the NHRA, are known as “fed-
eral LTC reform.” 
 298 See 42 C.F.R. pt. 483. On July 16, 2015, CMS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that 
would modify some of the LTC requirements. LTC Proposed Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,168. Be-
cause CMS has not yet issued a final rulemaking, this Article references the LTC requirements 
currently codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 483. 
 299 See, e.g., Xinzhi Zhang & David C. Grabowski, Nursing Home Staffing and Quality Under 
the Nursing Home Reform Act, 44 GERONTOLOGIST 13, 13 (2004) (“Following the [Nursing 
Home Reform Act], quality improvements were found in nursing homes nationwide, and these 
results suggest that part of this improvement was due to the quality and staffing regulations within 
the NHRA.”). 
 300 See infra notes 301–323 and accompanying text. 
 301 See, e.g., infra notes 302–323 and accompanying text. 
 302 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(b)(3)(C)(i)(I) (“[S]uch an assessment must be conducted . . . promptly 
upon . . . admission . . . .”). 
 303 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(b)(1). 
 304 Id. § 483.20(j)(1)(i)–(ii). 
 305 Id. § 483.20(k)(1). 
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her “highest practicable” physical and mental well-being.306 The care plan, 
which must be periodically reviewed and revised, shall be prepared by an 
interdisciplinary team that includes the resident’s attending physician, a reg-
istered nurse with responsibility to the resident, and other caregivers in dis-
ciplines relevant to the resident’s needs.307 
In accordance with the care plan, the LTC facility must provide care 
and services that will: (1) maintain or improve each resident’s ability to per-
form activities of daily living including bathing, ambulating, toileting, eat-
ing, and communicating;308 (2) maintain each resident’s vision and hear-
ing;309 (3) avoid the development of pressure sores;310 (4) avoid catheteriza-
tion;311 (5) maintain range of motion;312 (6) correct existing mental or psy-
chosocial adjustment difficulties;313 (7) prevent decreased social interaction 
and increased withdrawn, angry, or depressive behaviors;314 (8) maintain a 
safe environment free of accidents;315 and (9) maintain acceptable nutrition 
and hydration, body weight, and protein levels.316 
LTC facilities also must provide or arrange for medical, nursing, die-
tary, rehabilitation, dental, pharmacy, and other health services that will, 
again, “attain or maintain the highest practicable” physical and mental well-
being of each resident.317 For example, LTC facilities must ensure that each 
resident is under the care of an attending physician, that a second physician 
is available to supervise the medical care of a resident whose attending phy-
sician is unavailable, that each resident is visited by a physician at least 
once every thirty days, and that during those visits, the physician reviews 
each resident’s plan of care, including medications and treatments.318 LTC 
facilities also must provide a sufficient number of licensed nurses available 
on a twenty-four-hour basis319 as well as registered nurses available eight 
                                                                                                                           
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. § 483.20(k)(1)–(2). 
 308 Id. § 483.25(a)(1)–(2). 
 309 Id. § 483.25(b). 
 310 Id. § 483.25(c). 
 311 Id. § 483.25(d). 
 312 Id. § 483.25(e). 
 313 Id. § 483.25(f)(1). 
 314 Id. § 483.25(f)(2). 
 315 Id. § 483.25(h). 
 316 Id. § 483.25(i)–(j). 
 317 See, e.g., id. § 483.30 (nursing staff requirements); id. § 483.35(a) (dietary services re-
quirements); id. § 483.40 (physician supervision requirements); id. § 483.45 (specialized rehabili-
tation requirements, including physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech-language pa-
thology requirements); id. § 483.55 (dental service requirements); id. § 483.60 (pharmacy re-
quirements). 
 318 Id. § 483.40(a)–(c). 
 319 Id. § 483.30(a). 
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hours a day, seven days a week.320 In addition, LTC facilities with 121 or 
more licensed beds must hire a full-time social worker to provide medically 
related social services.321 
Finally, LTC facilities must create and implement a comprehensive in-
fection control program designed to help prevent the development and 
spread of infectious diseases.322 This program must identify the procedures 
by which the LTC facility: (1) identifies, manages, and treats infections in 
the facility; (2) determines which measures, such as segregation, should be 
applied to residents who have infectious diseases; (3) maintains records of 
infectious diseases acquired in the facility and responses thereto; (4) actual-
ly segregates residents who acquire infectious diseases; (5) prohibits em-
ployees with infectious diseases and skin lesions from contacting residents 
and their food; (6) requires staff to wash their hands following contact with 
each resident in accordance with accepted hand washing standards and 
techniques; and (7) handles bed and other linens in a manner that will stop 
the transmission of infections.323 
Why might these LTC requirements serve as a reference point for as-
sessing the health care provided in the context of immigration detention? 
First, LTC facilities and immigration detention centers have similar lengths 
of stay. Unlike general, acute care hospitals, which have short (4.5-day) av-
erage lengths of stay,324 SNF and NF residents stay in their facilities a long 
time. The average length of stay is twenty-seven days for Medicare SNFs 
and two years for Medicaid NFs.325 Due to their long-term nature as well as 
old, unfavorable reports of little actual nursing or other health care provided 
therein, many LTC facilities were, prior to federal LTC reform, unfavorably 
                                                                                                                           
 320 Id. § 483.30(b). 
 321 Id. § 483.15(g)(2). 
 322 Id. § 483.65. 
 323 Id. § 483.65(a)–(c). 
 324 AUDREY J. WEISS & ANNE ELIXHAUSER, HEALTHCARE COST & UTILIZATION PROJECT, 
OVERVIEW OF HOSPITAL STAYS IN THE UNITED STATES, STATISTICAL BRIEF 1 (2014), http://
www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb180-Hospitalizations-United-States-2012.pdf [http://
perma.cc/VT5X-JP55] (“In 2012, there were 36.5 million hospital stays in the United States, with 
an average length of stay of 4.5 days . . . .”); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L HOSP. DISCHARGE SURVEY: 2010, NUMBER & 
RATE OF HOSP. DISCHARGES 2 (2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhds/1general/2010gen1_
agesexalos.pdf [http://perma.cc/URX7-25V5] (using 2010 data, identifying the average length of 
stay as 4.8 days for both sexes, 5.2 days for males, and 4.5 days for females). 
 325 OFFICE OF DISABILITY, AGING, & LONG-TERM CARE POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., POST-ACUTE AND LONG-TERM CARE: A PRIMER ON SERVICES, EXPENDITURES, 
AND PAYMENT METHODS 1 tbl.1 (2010), http://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/76146/paltc.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/J7W6-E4AV]; see MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 198 tbl.8-7 (2014), http://medpac.gov/documents/
reports/mar14_entirereport.pdf [http://perma.cc/AB4P-BAV8] (providing average lengths of stay 
for freestanding Medicare SNFs in the top and bottom quartiles). 
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referred to as “holding facilities,” “pre-hospitalization holding facilities,” 
“well-intended residences for the incurably under-attended to,” “ware-
houses for death,” “places of abandonment,” and “dumping ground[s] for 
death.”326 Even though long-term care has vastly improved since federal 
LTC reform, the unfavorable names remain.327 
Like LTC facilities, immigration detention centers also have long aver-
age lengths of stay. Asylum seekers, for example, spend an average of twen-
ty-seven days in detention.328 Data are inconsistent for other noncitizens, 
with some reports identifying a thirty-day average length of stay and others 
identifying an eighty-one-day average length of stay.329 The detention sto-
ries shared in Part I of this Article illustrate the long-term nature of many 
detentions.330 For example, forty-four-year-old Salvadoran national Raul 
Ernesto Morales-Ramos was detained for almost five years; that is, from 
2010 until his death from intestinal cancer in 2015.331 Fernando Dominguez 
Valdivia spent one hundred days in ICE custody before he died of multiple 
organ failure.332 Tiombe Kimana Carlos also was in ICE custody for a long 
time. She was detained for more than two-and-a-half years before she 
hanged herself.333 Due to their long-term nature as well as their poor condi-
tions, many immigration detention centers share the unfavorable names giv-
                                                                                                                           
 326 See, e.g., Peter Children, Opinion, Nursing Homes Are “Warehouses for Death,” NORTH 
IOWA TODAY (July 4, 2012), http://northiowatoday.com/2012/07/04/op-ed-nursing-homes-are-
warehouses-for-death-by-peter-children/ [http://perma.cc/PE6H-2UJF] (“These warehouses for 
death are a blight on this country . . . . [T]hey are places of abandonment[,] a dumping ground for 
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down.”); Thomas Day, About Nursing Homes, NAT’L CARE PLAN. COUNCIL (July 12, 2015 7:35 
AM), https://bsl.app.box.com/s/zacdviats3ve6eek4x5f7403ow5qze5n [https://perma.cc/BZ25-
F8YM] (referring to nursing homes as holding facilities); Paula Span, Where Are the Nurses?, 
N.Y. TIMES: NEW OLD AGE BLOG (Aug. 13, 2014, 11:20 AM), http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.
com/2014/08/13/where-are-the-nurses/?_r=0\ [http://perma.cc/6ZZ9-VTP6] (“[W]e probably 
should refer to these facilities as something besides nursing homes: ‘pre-hospitalization holding 
facilities,’ perhaps, or ‘well-intended residences for the incurably under-attended to.’ You can 
probably come up with a few even-less-flattering names yourselves.”). 
 327 See supra note 326 and accompanying text. 
 328 See Mark Noferi, Immigration Detention: Behind the Record Numbers, CTR. FOR MIGRA-
TION STUD. (Feb. 13, 2014), http://cmsny.org/immigration-detention-behind-the-record-numbers/ 
[http://perma.cc/L7X5-TKRK]. 
 329 Id. 
 330 See supra notes 30–200 (providing stories of detainees who spent extensive amounts of 
time in detention). 
 331 Linthicum, supra note 1. 
 332 See Yáñez, supra note 3. 
 333 Michael Matza, Sad Tale of Mental Illness and U.S. Detention, PHILLY.COM (Nov. 15, 
2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-11-15/news/44078208_1_immigration-detainees-detainee-
deaths-u-s-immigration [http://perma.cc/7AK5-KXRY]. 
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en to LTC facilities prior to federal LTC reform: “warehouses for the men-
tally ill,” “holding pens,” “animal cages,” and “dumping grounds.”334 
Top detention officials, including Dennis Slate, the former ICE Chief 
of Psychology, also have noted the similarities between LTC facilities and 
detention centers. In a confidential internal email, Slate stated, “[The immi-
gration detention system was] set up for quick stays [but] turned into a de 
facto long-term care center for the most troublesome patients, those whose 
countries of origin often refused to take them.”335 Attorneys representing 
detainees allegedly denied adequate health care also liken immigration de-
tention and long-term care: “Health care for immigration detainees around 
the country . . . is premised on the often-false notion that detention is short-
term. In truth, many detainees spend months or years awaiting a final de-
termination of their immigration case, and are forced to suffer needlessly as 
a result . . . .”336 
In addition to the average lengths of stay, LTC facilities and immigra-
tion detention centers share other characteristics as well. For example, alt-
hough neither SNFs nor NFs were intended to primarily care for and treat 
mental disorders,337 many residents of LTC facilities do have mental ill-
                                                                                                                           
 334 See, e.g., Editorial, Death by Detention, N.Y. TIMES, (May 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/05/06/opinion/06tue1.html [http://perma.cc/ZKX9-L9ZL] (referring to detention centers as 
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cc/S5V4-WKH2] (likening noncitizen field processing shelters to holding pens and animal cages); 
Steve Williams, Opinion, Dumping Ground, or Revenue Center?, DAILY PRESS (July 11, 2014 
8:30 AM), http://www.vvdailypress.com/article/20140711/Opinion/140719975 [http://perma.cc/
J33M-LTYA] (reporting a local politician’s reference to a detention center as a “dumping 
ground”). 
 335 Priest & Goldstein, supra note 46. 
 336 Woods Complaint, supra note 49, at 1, 11. In reality, 
Because immigration detention is perceived to be short-term, medical personnel and 
persons charged with authorizing treatment delay or deny treatment in the hope that 
detainees will be removed from the United States or released from detention sooner, 
rather than later. This perception is often incorrect, as detainees with serious medical 
needs may spend months or years in detention pursuing their right to remain in the 
United States or seek refuge here. 
Id. 
 337 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(a)(1) (defining a SNF as an institution that, among other require-
ments, “is not primarily for the care and treatment of mental diseases”); id. § 1396r(a)(1) (defining 
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ness.338 More than 500,000 individuals with mental illness reside in LTC 
facilities on any particular day, leading some to classify LTC facilities as 
“de facto mental institution[s].”339 Indeed, studies estimate the prevalence 
of LTC facility residents with a primary diagnosis of mental illness at 
18.7% for residents sixty-five to seventy-four years old and 23.5% for resi-
dents eighty-five years of age and older.340 
Immigration detainees also have high rates of mental illness. The fed-
eral government conservatively estimated in one confidential memorandum 
that 15% of detainees have severe mental illness.341 Estimates of mental 
illness from other studies are significantly higher. One study of detainees 
seeking asylum found that 86% of those surveyed exhibited symptoms of 
clinical depression, 75% manifested anxiety-related symptoms, and 50% 
exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.342 These estimates are 
not surprising given the extreme vulnerability of detainees due to their his-
tory of torture and trauma, which may include human trafficking, sexual 
violence, political oppression, psychosocial trauma, and acculturative 
stress.343 Without proper diagnosis and treatment, detention can exacerbate 
preexisting vulnerabilities and contribute to severe mental illness.344 To re-
spond to the high rates of mental illness among residents, the LTC require-
ments contain numerous protective provisions, including mandatory as-
sessments of residents’ mood and behavior patterns,345 the creation and im-
plementation of comprehensive care plans that include measurable goals and 
objectives designed to meet residents’ mental health care needs,346 and the 
provision of treatment that will correct existing mental and psychosocial ad-
justment difficulties,347 prevent decreased social interaction, and prevent in-
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 346 Id. § 483.20(k)(1). 
 347 Id. § 483.25(f)(1). 
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creased withdrawn, angry, and depressive behaviors.348 As discussed in more 
detail in Part III, these protections may serve as a backdrop against which the 
lack of mental health care in immigration detention might be assessed.349 
C. Behavioral Health Laws 
Because of the high rates of mental illness among immigration detain-
ees, a third possible reference point includes federal regulations governing 
Medicare-participating psychiatric hospitals (called Medicare Conditions of 
Participation)350 and state laws regulating inpatient psychiatric hospitals and 
outpatient mental health centers351 (collectively, behavioral health laws). 
Because many provisions set forth in behavioral health laws are similar to 
those set forth in involuntary commitment laws and LTC requirements, a 
quick summary of only the most stringent provisions is provided below. 
Prompt health examinations and comprehensive care plans are central 
to most behavioral health laws.352 The Medicare Conditions of Participa-
tion, for example, require patients admitted to psychiatric hospitals to re-
ceive a comprehensive health examination within twenty-four hours of ad-
mission or registration.353 State behavioral health laws contain similar re-
quirements. Colorado, for example, requires patients admitted to a hospital 
for psychiatric care to receive an initial assessment for immediate safety 
needs within four hours of admission, a nursing assessment and care to 
maintain the patient’s health and safety within eight hours of admission, and 
a comprehensive psychiatric examination within twenty-four hours of ad-
mission.354 In Massachusetts, individuals admitted to facilities licensed by, 
contracted for, or operated by the Massachusetts Department of Mental 
Health also must receive prompt examinations, including a mental status 
examination “[u]pon admission” as well as a complete psychiatric and 
physical examination “within 24 hours of admission.”355 
                                                                                                                           
 348 Id. § 483.25(f)(2). 
 349 See infra notes 372–443 (arguing that regulations of LTC facilities could be used to prom-
ulgate legally enforceable regulations that would improve the health and safety of immigration 
detainees). 
 350 The Medicare Conditions of Participation for Psychiatric Hospitals are codified at 42 
C.F.R. §§ 482.60–.62. 
 351 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-1 (Rhode Island’s “Mental Health Law” that regulates 
state hospitals, public psychiatric inpatient facilities, general and special hospitals that offer be-
havioral health services, and community mental health facilities); 6 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1011-
1:XVIII (2014) (Colorado regulations governing psychiatric hospitals). 
 352 See infra notes 353–360 and accompanying text. 
 353 42 C.F.R. § 482.24(c)(4)(i)(A). 
 354 6 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1011-1:IV-26.102(1)(a)–(c). 
 355 104 MASS. CODE REGS. § 27.05(3) (2014). 
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The Medicare Conditions of Participation also require each psychiatric 
hospital patient to receive a comprehensive, individualized, treatment plan 
that documents the patient’s diagnosis, short-term and long-range goals, 
treatments ordered, and responsibilities of health care team members, 
among other important data.356 A physician who is responsible for the pa-
tient’s care as well as other health professionals who treat the patient must 
record progress notes at least weekly for the patient’s first two months in 
the psychiatric hospital.357 Recommendations for treatment plan revisions 
and accurate evaluations of the patient’s progress are an essential part of 
these progress notes.358 State law is similar. Colorado, for example, requires 
patients admitted to a hospital for psychiatric services to receive treatment 
in accordance with an individualized care plan that is initiated by an inter-
disciplinary care team within twenty-four hours of admission.359 The inter-
disciplinary team is required to finish the care plan within seventy-two 
hours of admission and review the plan once a week during the patient’s 
first month as an inpatient.360 
Behavioral health laws also contain strict staffing requirements. The 
Medicare Conditions of Participation, for example, require psychiatric hos-
pitals to have “adequate numbers of qualified professional and supportive 
staff to evaluate patients, formulate written, individualized comprehensive 
treatment plans, provide active treatment measures, and engage in discharge 
planning.”361 The Medicare Conditions of Participation also contain mini-
mum staffing requirements for certain professionals. For example, a regis-
tered (not just licensed) nurse must be available at each psychiatric hospital 
twenty-four hours a day.362 State law is similar. Colorado, for example, re-
quires hospitals that provide psychiatric services to have a physician direc-
tor of such services who is a board-certified in psychiatry and neurology,363 
a registered nurse available in the psychiatric unit twenty-four hours per 
day, seven days per week,364 and a sufficient number of other health profes-
sionals to evaluate each patient’s mental health care needs, implement each 
patient’s individualized care plan, and ensure the safety of other patients 
and staff members.365 
                                                                                                                           
 356 42 C.F.R. § 482.61(c)(1). 
 357 Id. § 482.61(d). 
 358 Id. 
 359 6 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1011-1:IV-26.102(2)(a). 
 360 Id. § 1011-1:IV-26.102(2)(b). 
 361 42 C.F.R. § 482.62. 
 362 Id. § 482.62(d)(2). 
 363 6 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1011-1:IV-26.101(2). 
 364 Id. § 1011-1:IV-26.101(3)(b). 
 365 Id. § 1011-1:IV-26.101(7). 
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In addition, behavioral health laws contain stringent infection control 
requirements.366 The Medicare Conditions of Participation, for example, 
require a “sanitary environment to avoid sources and transmission of infec-
tions and communicable diseases” and an “active program for the preven-
tion, control, and investigation of infections and communicable diseases.”367 
As part of that program, an infection control officer must develop a system 
for “identifying, reporting, investigating, and controlling infections and 
communicable diseases of patients and personnel.”368 In addition, each hos-
pital’s chief executive officer, medical staff, and director of nursing services 
have legal responsibility for ensuring that any infections found by the infec-
tion control officer are appropriately managed through the hospital’s quality 
assessment and improvement program and for implementing corrective ac-
tion plans that identify the root causes of infections and prevent them from 
reoccurring.369 
Finally, behavioral health laws contain detailed suicide prevention re-
quirements. Oregon, for example, requires its Medicaid-participating behav-
ioral health providers to adopt and implement written suicide prevention 
policies describing how they will respond to the potential for patient sui-
cide. Among other elements, these policies must address the performance of 
suicide risk assessments on the day of patient intake, documentation of sui-
cidal ideation and other forms of self-harm, communication of findings re-
garding suicidal ideation and self-harm to all staff, implementation of sui-
cide and self-harm precautions, comprehensive staff training on suicide and 
self-harm prevention and risk assessment, and implementation of post-
suicide or self-harm intervention plans.370 
III. THE GRAPES OF WRATH: IMPROVING THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF 
IMMIGRATION DETAINEES 
The previous Part identifies the limitations of constitutional law, inter-
national human rights law, and tort law with respect to producing compre-
hensive health and safety reform in the context of immigration detention.371 
The federal government has attempted to respond to these limitations by 
publishing specific, ex ante guidelines that address the provision of health 
care in detention. The former Immigration and Naturalization Service 
                                                                                                                           
 366 See 42 C.F.R. § 482.60(b) (stating that psychiatric hospitals must comply with the Condi-
tions of Participation set forth at 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.25–.57); id. § 482.42 (setting forth the Condi-
tion of Participation for infection control). 
 367 Id. § 482.42. 
 368 Id. § 482.42(a). 
 369 Id. § 482.42(b). 
 370 OR. ADMIN. R. 410-170-0030(11)(a)(H) (2014). 
 371 See supra notes 201–370 and accompanying text. 
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(“INS”) issued the first set of National Detention Standards in 2000 (“2000 
NDS”),372 ICE issued a second set of Performance-Based National Deten-
tion Standards in 2008 (“2008 PBNDS”),373 and ICE issued a third set of 
Performance-Based National Detention Standards in 2011 (“2011 
PBNDS”).374 These standards, however, share the same limitations as many 
international human rights documents; that is, they are not legally enforcea-
ble in court and injured detainees have no cause of action or other recourse 
under them.375 
Even if they were enforceable, the federal government’s most recent—
and stringent—guidelines, the 2011 PBNDS, do not apply to all detention 
centers. Some detention centers only comply with the less stringent 2000 
NDS or 2008 PBNDS because their contracts with ICE do not specify that 
they have to comply with the 2011 PBNDS.376 Baker County Jail, Polk 
County Detention Facility, Pinal County Jail, and Tri-County Detention 
Center, for example, are still only contractually obligated to follow the for-
mer INS’s 2000 NDS.377 Likewise, Stewart Detention Center and Theo 
Lacy Detention Center are only contractually obligated to follow the 2008 
PBNDS.378 
Finally, even if all detention centers in United States were required to 
comply with the 2011 PBNDS, the guidelines set forth in these standards 
are substantively inadequate. Using the reference laws as evidence of con-
temporary health and safety standards, the remainder of this Part identifies 
the shortcomings of the 2011 PBNDS and makes eight specific recommen-
dations that, if promulgated by the U.S Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) into legally enforceable regulations, would improve immigration 
detainees’ access to physical and mental health care. 
                                                                                                                           
 372 2000 NDS, supra note 10. 
 373 2008 PBNDS, supra note 10. 
 374 2011 PBNDS, supra note 10. 
 375 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED AND DISMISSED, WOMEN’S STRUGGLE TO 
OBTAIN HEALTH CARE IN UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION DETENTION 17 (2009), https://www.
hrw.org/report/2009/03/17/detained-and-dismissed/womens-struggles-obtain-health-care-united-
states [https://perma.cc/KUR7-W5JC] (“ICE has internal enforcement mechanism for its detention 
standards, but . . . the standards . . . are not legally enforceable.”). 
 376 See, e.g., infra notes 377–378. 
 377 BAKER COUNTY JAIL REPORT, supra note 38, at 3 (stating that the “2000 INS National 
Detention Standards” apply to Baker County Jail); PINAL COUNTY JAIL REPORT, supra note 89, at 
2 (stating that the jail “[o]perates under 2000 National Detention Standards”); POLK COUNTY 
DETENTION FACILITY REPORT, supra note 90, at 3 (“According to ICE, the 2000 National Deten-
tion Standards apply.”); TRI-COUNTY DETENTION CENTER REPORT, supra note 93, at 2 (stating 
that the “2000 National Detention Standards” apply to Tri-County). 
 378 STEWART DETENTION CENTER REPORT, supra note 61, at 3 (“According to ICE, the 2008 
Performance Based National Detention Standards apply.”); THEO LACY DETENTION CENTER 
REPORT, supra note 41, at 5 (noting that the Orange County Sheriff’s Department is contractually 
obligated to follow the 2008 PBNDS). 
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The first recommendation relates to the timeliness of detainee health 
examinations. The 2011 PBNDS provide that detainees shall receive a 
“comprehensive health assessment, including a physical examination and a 
mental health screening . . . no later than 14 days after entering into ICE 
custody or arrival at [a detention center].”379 ICE’s own internal documenta-
tion, shared in Part I,380 shows that, notwithstanding this two-week guide-
line, many detainees do not receive these examinations until day sixteen,381 
day twenty-one,382 or later, if at all.383 Many detainee deaths occur earlier 
than these dates. Chinese national Qi Gen Guo committed suicide at the 
Clinton County Correctional Facility on day nine of his detention, for ex-
ample.384 Salvadoran national Ana Romero Rivera hanged herself at Frank-
lin County Regional Jail on day fourteen of her detention.385 
Compare, however, the illustrative involuntary commitment laws of 
North Carolina, Texas, and Washington, discussed in Part II,386 which 
demonstrate that the standard for prompt physical and mental health exami-
nations in the context of civil commitment is in the range of twelve to twen-
ty-four hours following emergency detention, the filing of a petition for in-
voluntary treatment, and/or admission to a facility for the provision of in-
voluntary treatment.387 Some state involuntary commitment laws require the 
mental portion of these health examinations to occur within a shorter time 
frame.388 In Washington, for example, mental health examinations must oc-
cur within three hours of arrival at a court-ordered treatment facility if the 
individual is an adult, or within twelve hours of arrival if the individual is a 
child who is being placed in an inpatient facility.389 
Like involuntary commitment laws, the LTC requirements also require 
residents to be comprehensively examined promptly upon admission to a 
                                                                                                                           
 379 2011 PBNDS, supra note 10, at 278 (Standard 4.3(II)(15)). 
 380 See supra notes 30–200 (providing ICE documentation of delays in provision of medical 
examinations within the context of individual detainee accounts). 
 381 See Carlos Investigation Memorandum, supra note 8, at 5 (noting that York County Jail 
detainee Tiombe Kimana Carlos was not physically examined until day sixteen of her detention). 
 382 See supra notes 50, 54 and accompanying text (noting that Jose Lopez-Gregorio, who 
eventually committed suicide, did not receive physical examination until twenty-first day of deten-
tion). 
 383 See supra notes 55, 59 and accompanying text (noting the absence of physical exam or 
medical appointment prior to Mario Francisco Chavez-Torres’s death from a brain aneurysm). 
 384 LIST OF DEATHS, supra note 3, at 4; see also Press Release, Lock Haven Hospital, supra 
note 143. 
 385 See Lannen & Spears, supra note 144. 
 386 See supra notes 241–252 and accompanying text (providing examples of state require-
ments for prompt medical examinations). 
 387 See supra notes 241–252 and accompanying text. 
 388 See infra note 389 and accompanying text. 
 389 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-865-0541(3) (2014). 
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SNF or an NF.390 Some behavioral health laws also require physical and 
mental health examinations as soon as four hours but no later than twenty-
four hours following admission to an inpatient psychiatric hospital or treat-
ment at a community mental health facility.391 
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(2), the Secretary of DHS has the authority to 
issue legally enforceable federal regulations establishing the standard of 
care for individuals in ICE custody.392 This Article recommends that DHS 
promulgate a new regulation requiring each detainee to receive a compre-
hensive physical and mental health examination as soon as possible but no 
later than twenty-four hours following detention, which is the outside limit 
for health examinations under the reference laws. The individuals who are 
qualified to perform these examinations, the systems and functions that 
must be assessed during these examinations, and the formal documentation 
requirements relating to these examinations should be determined by DHS 
through a notice of proposed rulemaking that solicits commentary from the 
public, including members of the health care industry, immigrant rights or-
ganizations, human rights organizations, and other interested parties. 
The second recommendation relates to plans of care. The 2011 PBNDS 
only provide for written plans of care for detainees who “require[] close, 
chronic or convalescent medical supervision.”393 Many individuals enter 
detention with minor health conditions that may not appear to meet these 
subjective thresholds but that quickly progress to life-threatening, acute 
conditions without medical treatment. The story of Martin Hernandez Ban-
deras, who suffered a minor foot bruise that later turned into an infected 
ulcer that eventually turned gangrenous and required six weeks of inpatient 
treatment and several surgeries, is just one example.394 
In comparison, all three sets of reference laws require the creation, 
formal documentation, implementation, and periodic revision of compre-
hensive plans of care that identify, among other things, the health care ser-
vices an individual needs to attain or maintain reasonable health and well-
being.395 This Article thus recommends that DHS promulgate a new regula-
                                                                                                                           
 390 See supra note 303 and accompanying text (requiring comprehensive assessments in mul-
tiple health areas shortly after admission). 
 391 This can depend on whether the relevant health law is state law or federal law and on 
whether the relevant law applies to inpatient or outpatient settings. See supra notes 352–355 and 
accompanying text. 
 392 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (2014). 
 393 2011 PBNDS, supra note 14, at 278 (Standard 4.3(II)(8)). 
 394 See supra notes 106–110 and accompanying text (detailing the story of Martin Hernandez 
Banderas). 
 395 See, e.g., supra notes 246–248, 255–257, 305–307, and 356–360 and accompanying text 
(evaluating legal requirements for creation and implementation of individual health plans for indi-
viduals committed to mental health facilities). 
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tion requiring each detainee who has any physical or mental health condi-
tion identified during the initial health examination, or for which medically 
necessary health care services are requested by the detainee at any point 
during detention, to have a care plan created, documented, implemented, 
and periodically revised by the detention facility. Through a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking, DHS should solicit commentary from the public regard-
ing the health professionals who shall be permitted to create or participate 
in the creation of the care plan, the required elements of the care plan, doc-
umentation requirements relating to the care plan, and time frames for initi-
ation, completion, implementation, and periodic revision of the care plan. 
The third recommendation relates to treatment. This is one area where 
the 2011 PBNDS, at first glance, appear adequate. For example, Standard 
4.3(II)(1) of the 2011 PBNDS provides, “Detainees shall have access to a 
continuum of health services, including . . . prevention, health education, 
diagnosis and treatment.”396 Standard 4.3(II)(2) requires a “mental health 
staffing component” to be “on call to respond to the needs of the detainee 
population 24 hours a day, seven days a week.”397 Standard 4.3(II)(4) re-
quires that detainees “be able to request health services on a daily basis and 
. . . receive timely follow-up.”398 Standard 4.3(II)(9) provides that, “Twenty-
four hour emergency medical and mental health services shall be available 
to all detainees.”399 Standard 4.3(II)(12) provides that, “Detainees with 
chronic conditions shall receive care and treatment, as needed, that includes 
monitoring of medications, diagnostic testing and chronic care clinics.”400 A 
number of additional standards, expected outcomes, and expected practices 
provide guidance regarding the treatment of detainees.401 
Some of these standards could be improved, including by incorporat-
ing specific time frames, in hours or days, where the 2011 PBNDS only re-
quire a “timely” response. The problem, as Part I illustrates,402 is that these 
standards are neither followed nor enforced. This Article recommends that 
DHS promulgate a third regulation giving detainees the legally enforceable 
right to receive adequate, or reasonable, medical care that is necessary and 
appropriate for their health conditions and from which they can reasonably 
be expected to benefit.403 Like the treatment standard set forth in the refer-
                                                                                                                           
 396 2011 PBNDS, supra note 10, at 277 (Standard 4.3(II)(1)). 
 397 Id. (Standard 4.3(II)(2)). 
 398 Id. at 278 (Standard 4.3(II)(4)). 
 399 Id. (Standard 4.3(II)(9)). 
 400 Id. (Standard 4.3(II)(12)). 
 401 Id. at 277–308 (Standards 4.3–4.4). 
 402 See supra notes 30–200 (offering examples of detainees not receiving appropriate or nec-
essary care, despite the requirements of 2011 PBNDS). 
 403 Cf. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (“[Involuntarily committed 
individuals] unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will 
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ence laws,404 as well as the standard announced by the handful of courts that 
have addressed the tort law obligations of detention medical staff vis-à-vis 
immigration detainees,405 the regulation should specify that treatment in 
detention must be “consistent with accepted medical standards.” Through a 
notice of proposed rulemaking, DHS should solicit commentary on imple-
mentation details including detainee means for requesting treatment, time 
frames within which treatment must be provided or initiated, and means for 
accessing medically necessary treatment not available at the detention center. 
It may be argued that the primary purpose of immigration detention is 
to detain, not to treat; therefore, detention centers should not be required to 
provide health care consistent with accepted medical standards. In response, 
this Article contends that health care is unlike other goods and services be-
cause substandard care can be injurious or deadly. For example, Francisco 
Castaneda’s squamous cell carcinoma produced early, telltale symptoms 
including a white-and-yellow raised lesion that was bleeding and discharg-
ing pus.406 The San Diego Correctional Facility refused to arrange for the 
medically accepted, standard diagnostic test; that is, a biopsy or excision 
and histologic confirmation.407 The federal government later agreed that this 
                                                                                                                           
give each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental health condi-
tion.”), aff’d sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 404 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 122C-266(d) (West 2014) (announcing the standard as 
“reasonable and appropriate medication and treatment that are consistent with accepted medical 
standards”). 
 405 See, e.g., Banderas Findings, supra note 108, at 8 (stating, in the context of an immigra-
tion detainee’s negligence lawsuit against a medical staff member at San Diego Correctional Fa-
cility, that “[a] physician is negligent if he or she fails to use the level of skill, knowledge, and 
care in diagnosis and treatment that other reasonably careful physicians would use in the same or 
similar circumstances”). The Banderas court further stated,  
The Court finds Plaintiff has proven a case of medical negligence. Dr. Hui failed to 
use the level of skill, knowledge, and care in diagnosis and treatment that a reasona-
bly careful physician would have used in similar circumstances. The care was sub-
standard . . . . This substandard care injured Plaintiff and caused him to suffer dam-
ages. Dr. Hui’s acts of negligence were within the scope of her employment for the 
United States, and thus the United States is liable for her negligent actions under the 
FTCA. 
Id. at 10. 
 406 See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text (providing further detail of untreated cancer 
symptoms). 
 407 See Alexander Stratigos et al., Diagnosis and Treatment of Invasive Squamous Cell Carci-
noma of the Skin: European Consensus-Based Interdisciplinary Guideline, 51 EUR. J. CANCER 
1989, 1990 (2015) (“A biopsy or excision and histologic confirmation should be performed in all 
clinically suspicious lesions in order to facilitate the prognostic classification and correct man-
agement of [the carcinoma].”); supra notes 65–78 (describing failings of detention center related 
to diagnosis and treatment). 
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substandard care was the cause in fact as well as the proximate cause of 
Castaneda’s death.408 
By further example, consider the tuberculosis death of Mexican Jose 
Javier Hernandez-Valencia, shared in Part I, section B.409 The national and 
international standard for treatment of tuberculosis includes an initial, two-
month treatment phase using the drugs isoniazid, rifampicin, pyrazinamide, 
and ethambutol, as well as a second, four-month treatment phase using the 
drugs isoniazid and rifampicin.410 Houston Contract Detention Facility’s 
deviation from this medically accepted standard contributed to Hernandez-
Valencia’s death. 
By final example, Algerian national Hassiba Belbachir disclosed to a 
social worker at McHenry County Jail a prior suicide attempt, a current de-
sire to die, and a present thought that “[d]eath is dripping, drop by drop.”411 
As described in Part I, section C, McHenry County Jail neither placed Bel-
bachir on suicide watch nor expedited her medical appointment although 
standard suicide risk algorithms actually direct immediate hospitalization.412 
Federal officials later found that McHenry County Jail’s substandard care 
contributed to Belbachir’s death. 
These three examples illustrate how health care differs from other goods 
and services because substandard health care can be deadly. This Article 
therefore argues for the application of the “medically accepted standard of 
care” in immigration detention; that is, not health care above the standard of 
care, just health care consistent with nationally recognized standards of ade-
quate health care. In situations in which a detention center does not have the 
                                                                                                                           
 408 Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 804 n.3 (2010) (“[T]he government filed a formal notice 
admitting liability with respect to respondents’ claims for negligence under the [Federal Tort 
Claims Act].”). 
 409 See supra notes 101–104 and accompanying text (detailing Hernandez-Valencia’s death 
by tuberculosis). 
 410 See, e.g., THE TUBERCULOSIS COAL. FOR TECH. ASSISTANCE, INTERNATIONAL STAND-
ARDS FOR TUBERCULOSIS CARE: DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH 5 (2006), http://
www.who.int/tb/publications/2006/istc_report.pdf?ua=1 [http://perma.cc/YRP4-PMRJ]. The re-
port states that, 
The basic principles of care for persons with, or suspected of having, tuberculosis 
are the same worldwide: a diagnosis should be established promptly and accurately; 
standardized treatment regimens of proven efficacy should be used with appropriate 
treatment support and supervision; the response to treatment should be monitored; 
and the essential public health responsibilities must be carried out. 
Id. 
 411 See supra notes 177–192 and accompanying text (providing details and evidentiary sup-
port of Hassiba Belbachir’s disclosure of suicidal ideation). 
 412 See, e.g., Michael F. Gliatto & Anil K. Rai, Evaluation and Treatment of Patients with 
Suicidal Ideation, 59 AM. FAMILY PHYSICIAN 1500 fig.1 (1999) (providing an algorithm for the 
evaluation of suicidal patients). 
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staff or facilities to provide such care, the detention center has an obligation 
to transfer the detainee to an appropriate provider of care.413 In some cases, 
there may be a question as to what the standard of care is, and in situations in 
which there is more than one accepted standard of care, or there is a “respect-
able minority” standard of care, a reasoned decision by detention staff to ad-
here to one of the accepted standards, or the “respectable minority” standard, 
would be acceptable.414 Because most detention injuries and deaths result 
from a refusal of detention staff to provide any health care, not the provision 
of arguably adequate health care, it is anticipated that disputes involving the 
standard of care will be relatively infrequent. 
This Article’s recommended treatment regulation is consistent with le-
gal principles identified in other contexts, including the criminal justice 
context. For example, the primary purpose of jails and prisons is to detain 
and incarcerate suspected and convicted criminals, not to treat.415 Neverthe-
less, the moment a state or local government, or the Federal Bureau of Pris-
ons, takes a suspect into custody, courts have held that the relevant govern-
ment assumes a legal obligation to provide adequate, or reasonable, health 
care to that individual.416  
                                                                                                                           
 413 See Jacoby v. State, 434 So. 2d 570, 573–74 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (“[C]onfining authorities, 
such as the sheriff . . . have a legal obligation to provide medical treatment for prisoners. If these 
medical services are not available on the premises, it is the duty of the confining authority to trans-
fer a sick prisoner to a medical facility for appropriate treatment.” (citations omitted)). 
 414 See, e.g., Meghan C. O’Connor, The Physician-Patient Relationship and the Professional 
Standard of Care: Reevaluating Medical Negligence Principles to Achieve the Goals of Tort Re-
form, 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 109, 116–27 (2010) (discussing the standard of care, in-
cluding the “respectable minority” standard). 
 415 Cf. Jacoby, 434 So. 2d at 577 (“The principal purpose of [Southeast Louisiana Hospital] is 
to provide appropriate medical treatment for mental illness and, thus, is different from that of a 
prison . . . .”). 
 416 See, e.g., Carson v. United States, No. 13-cv-02962-CMA-KLM, 2014 WL 3563021, at *6 
(D. Colo. 2014) (“Prison officials have a legal duty to ‘ensure that inmates receive adequate . . . 
medical care . . . .’”); Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr. v. County of Essex, 543 A.2d 34, 43 (N.J. 1988) 
(“The County’s legal duty was to provide for Williams’ health care while he was a prisoner 
. . . .”). As one district court described it,  
[T]he Defendant concededly had a legal duty of care, as prison officials have a duty 
to provide appropriate medical care to prisoners. While this duty can reach the level 
of a constitutional claim in so far as appropriate medical care for prisoners is man-
dated by the Eighth Amendment, for purposes of an FTCA claim . . . the standard of 
duty owed is that of “reasonable care.” 
Butler v. Does, No. 9:08-2760-HFF-BM, 2010 WL 4929572, at *6 (D.S.C. 2010). Another court 
explained:  
[C]onfining authorities, such as the sheriff . . . have a legal obligation to provide 
medical treatment for prisoners. If these medical services are not available on the 
premises, it is the duty of the confining authority to transfer a sick prisoner to a med-
ical facility for appropriate treatment. The standard of care imposed upon the confin-
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Finally, it must be noted that ICE has no legal obligation to provide 
health care to individuals in the community at large,417 including aliens who 
have been released on recognizance, community support, or bond.418 ICE 
could choose one of these safe, effective, and humane alternatives to deten-
tion to enforce federal immigration law,419 relieving itself of the responsibil-
ity to provide adequate health care to detainees. The moment ICE decides to 
take an individual into custody, however, ICE assumes a legal duty to pro-
vide adequate, or reasonable, health care to that individual.420 From that 
point forward, both acts (including the negligent examination, diagnosis, or 
treatment of a detainee) as well as omissions (including the failure to exam-
ine, diagnose, or treat a detainee, or to transfer a detainee to an outside med-
ical facility when medically necessary) can violate legal duties.421 
In addition to recommendations relating to prompt health examina-
tions, individualized plans of care, and treatment in accordance with medi-
cally accepted standards, this Article makes a fourth recommendation; that 
is, a staffing recommendation. The 2011 PBNDS provide that, “Health care 
services shall be provided by a sufficient number of appropriately trained 
                                                                                                                           
ing authority in providing for the medical needs of inmates is that those services be 
adequate and reasonable. 
Jacoby, 434 So. 2d at 573–74 (citations omitted). 
 417 See, e.g., Joseph M. Healy, Legal Obligations of Genetic Counselors, in GENETICS AND 
THE LAW II 69, 73 (Aubrey Milunsky & George J. Annas eds., 2d ed. 1979) (“There is no general 
right to health care in the United States.”); RICHARD K. RIEGELMAN, PUBLIC HEALTH 101: 
HEALTHY PEOPLE—HEALTHY POPULATIONS 73 (2010) (“[A] right to health care in the United 
States has not been generally established.”). 
 418 See IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, RUTGERS SCH. OF LAW-NEWARK, FREED BUT NOT 
FREE: A REPORT EXAMINING THE CURRENT USE OF ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION 10 (2012), 
http://www.law.newark.rutgers.edu/files/FreedbutnotFree.pdf [http://perma.cc/JZ69-T6R4] [here-
inafter RUTGERS CLINIC REPORT] (identifying release on recognizance, community support, or 
bond as alternative to detention (“ATD”) programs and stating “ATD programs allow ICE offi-
cials to meet their law enforcement objectives, while avoiding the pitfalls and human costs associ-
ated with detention in secure facilities”). 
 419 See RUTHIE EPSTEIN, ALTERNATIVES TO IMMIGRATION DETENTION: LESS COSTLY AND 
MORE HUMANE THAN FEDERAL LOCK-UP 1 (2014) (identifying release on recognizance, commu-
nity support, or bond as safe, effective, and humane alternatives to detention). 
 420 See Banderas Findings, supra note 108, at 8 (stating, in the context of a lawsuit by a de-
tainee against a physician staff member at San Diego Correctional Facility based on the physi-
cian’s failure to provide adequate health care, “A physician is negligent if he or she fails to use the 
level of skill, knowledge, and care in diagnosis and treatment that other reasonably careful physi-
cians would use in the same or similar circumstances.”); cf. Borrego v. City of El Paso, 964 
S.W.2d 954, 958 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (“[O]nce a government health-care provider begins to treat 
a patient, the duty of care owed to the patient is no different from the duty of care owed by any 
medical professional.”). 
 421 See supra note 420 and accompanying text; cf. Brown v. Pa. Dep’t of Health Emergency 
Med. Svcs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 477 (3d Cir. 2003) (“It is a basic tenet of tort law that 
although an individual generally has no duty to rescue, once voluntarily undertaken, a rescue must 
not be performed negligently.”). 
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and qualified personnel.”422 The word “sufficient” allows for subjective in-
terpretations regarding appropriate staff-to-detainee ratios. The reference 
laws discussed in Part II423 show a trend towards specific staff-to-patient 
ratios, including particular types of staff members. The LTC requirements, 
for example, require LTC facilities with 121 or more licensed beds to hire a 
full-time social worker to provide medically related social services.424 The 
Medicare Conditions of Participation, by further example, require a regis-
tered (not just licensed) nurse to be available at each psychiatric hospital 
twenty-four hours a day.425 Similarly, Colorado law requires hospitals that 
provide psychiatric services to have a physician director of psychiatric ser-
vices who is a board-certified in psychiatry and neurology426 as well as a 
registered nurse available in the psychiatric unit twenty-four hours per day, 
seven days per week.427 This Article recommends that DHS promulgate a 
regulation establishing minimum medical, nursing, and other health profes-
sional staffing ratios. Through a notice of proposed rulemaking, DHS should 
solicit commentary regarding appropriate staff as well as staffing ratios. 
The fifth and sixth recommendations relate to infection control and su-
icide prevention. The 2011 PBNDS contain some guidelines regarding in-
fection control,428 including a requirement for written plans that address the 
management of infectious and communicable diseases.429 The 2011 PBNDS 
also contain some guidelines regarding suicide prevention,430 including a 
requirement for a written suicide prevention and intervention program.431 
The problem, as illustrated in Part I, is that these guidelines are neither fol-
lowed nor enforced.432 This Article recommends that DHS promulgate two 
additional regulations requiring the implementation of active programs for 
the prevention, intervention, and control of infections and suicide, respec-
tively. Through a notice of proposed rulemaking, DHS should solicit com-
mentary on the elements of these programs, the individuals responsible for 
implementing these programs, staff training requirements, and, when infec-
tions and suicides occur, root-cause analyses and corrective action plans. 
                                                                                                                           
 422 2011 PBNDS, supra note 10, at 279 (Standard 4.3(II)(21)). 
 423 See supra notes 201–370 (examining reference laws from various states and considering 
requirements related to health care provisions for residents in LTC facilities). 
 424 See supra note 321 and accompanying text (explaining the federal regulation requiring a 
full-time social worker for LTC facilities with 121 beds or more). 
 425 42 C.F.R. § 482.62(d)(2) (2014). 
 426 6 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1011-1:IV-26.101(2) (2014). 
 427 Id. § 1011-1:IV-26.101(3)(b). 
 428 2011 PBNDS, supra note 10, at 282–85 (Standard 4.3(V)(C)). 
 429 Id. at 282 (Standard 4.3(V)(C)(1)). 
 430 Id. at 314–19 (Standard 4.6). 
 431 Id. at 315 (Standard 4.6(V)). 
 432 See supra notes 30–200 (demonstrating the lack of enforcement of 2011 PBNDS guide-
lines through stories of individual detainees who were denied necessary health care). 
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The seventh recommendation relates to detainee complaints and inves-
tigations. The 2011 PBNDS contain some guidelines regarding detainee 
grievances,433 including provisions allowing detainees to “file formal griev-
ances, including medical grievances, and [to] receive written responses, 
including the basis for the decision, in a timely manner.”434 As written, the 
2011 PBNDS also require medical staff to respond to medical grievances 
within five working days.435 The stories detailed in Part I illustrate that 
these guidelines are neither followed nor enforced and that detainees wait 
weeks or months for responses to their medical grievances.436 DHS should 
promulgate a legally enforceable regulation establishing a formal complaint 
and investigation process. Through a notice of proposed rulemaking, DHS 
should solicit commentary on the elements of this process, the means for 
making detainees aware of their right to file complaints through this pro-
cess, the time frames within which detention officials must initiate and con-
clude investigations of complaints, the time frame within which detention 
officials must respond to complaints, and internal appeal rights and external 
complaint rights of detainees, including the right to complain directly to the 
federal government.437 
The eighth recommendation relates to penalties for detention center 
non-compliance with the regulations outlined above. In the health care in-
dustry, health care facilities that contract with the Federal Department of 
Health and Human Services to provide health care services to government 
beneficiaries are subject to a range of penalties for non-compliance, includ-
ing exclusion from the Medicare and Medicaid programs—resulting in ter-
mination of the ability to receive reimbursements for treating government 
program patients—as well as civil money penalties that accrue on a daily 
basis, significant criminal fines, incarceration, and potential false claims 
liability.438 Of these, exclusion from the Medicare and Medicaid Programs, 
known as the “financial death sentence,” is particularly effective due to 
providers’ heavy reliance on Medicare and Medicaid dollars.439 The federal 
                                                                                                                           
 433 2011 PBNDS, supra note 10, at 392–400 (Standard 6.2). 
 434 Id. at 392 (Standard 6.2(II)(3)). 
 435 Id. at 398 (Standard 6.2(V)(C)(4)). 
 436 See supra notes 30–200. 
 437 See, e.g., How to File a Complaint, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://
www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/complaints/ [http://perma.cc/3TVL-ECHT] (detailing how pa-
tients who believe their confidentiality rights have been violated can file a complaint with the 
Office of Civil Rights). 
 438 See, e.g., Tovino, supra note 11 (manuscript at 44 nn.276–82) (outlining penalties that 
may be imposed on Medicare-participating hospitals that violate the Medicare Conditions of Par-
ticipation). 
 439 See, e.g., Randall R. Fearnow & Jaya F. White, Permissive Exclusion: OIG Proposes Rule 
Creating More Problems, Not Solutions for Long Term Care Providers, 17(2) LTC-SIR ADVISOR 
7, 9 (2014), http://www.quarles.com/content/uploads/2014/11/AHLA-article-published-LTC_Oct
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civil money penalty regulation that imposes steep penalties (ranging from 
$3050 to $10,000 per day, per uncorrected violation) for situations that 
cause, or are likely to cause, serious injury, harm, impairment, or death to a 
patient,440 also serves as an effective compliance tool. The False Claims 
Act, a federal law that allows the Office of Inspector General to impose 
steep civil penalties on health care providers that submit claims for reim-
bursement to the Medicare program for substandard health care provided to 
Medicare beneficiaries, also provides a useful compliance incentive.441 
This Article recommends a similar range of penalties for detention 
centers that fail to comply with the regulations proposed above, regardless 
of whether the detention center is owned by ICE, operated by the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, run by a state or local sheriff’s office or jail, or managed 
by a for-profit corrections or detention company. Through a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking, DHS should solicit commentary on the types of civil, 
criminal, and administrative penalties that may be imposed on non-
compliant detention centers, the level of intent required for the imposition 
of such penalties, the procedures for imposing such penalties, and the ap-
peal and other due process rights of detention centers. Given that a majority 
of immigration detention beds are located in detention centers owned and 
operated by private, for-profit corporations organized for the purpose of 
maximizing profits,442 the threat of civil monetary penalties, criminal fines, 
                                                                                                                           
14-R-Fearnow-J-White-pdf.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z3J2-QK3C] (“Failure to comply, which may 
result in an exclusion, could be a virtual death sentence for most SNFs, which depend heavily on 
Medicare and Medicaid for their livelihood.”); GWINNETT HEALTH SYS., CODE OF CONDUCT AND 
PRINCIPLES OF ETHICAL BUSINESS PRACTICES 9 (2015), http://www.gwinnettmedicalcenter.org/
media/file/Code%20of%20Conduct%202015.pdf [http://perma.cc/AFG7-6RJG] (“Some refer to 
exclusions as a ‘financial death sentence’ because excluded persons and entities may not receive 
payment for treating any Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.”). 
 440 See 42 C.F.R. § 488.438(a)(1)(i) (2014) (outlining the civil monetary penalties that may be 
imposed for deficiencies constituting immediate jeopardy); id. § 489.3 (defining immediate jeop-
ardy as a situation in which a health care provider’s noncompliance with one or more Conditions 
of Participation “has caused, or is likely to cause, serious injury, harm, impairment, or death to a 
resident”); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL app. Q at 
2–8 (2014), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/som
107ap_q_immedjeopardy.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5AH-VBMG] (outlining situations that consti-
tute immediate jeopardy). 
 441 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Aranda v. Cmty. Psychiatric Ctrs., 945 F. Supp. 1485, 1487, 
1489 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (holding psychiatric hospital that failed to provide patients with a reason-
ably safe environment and then billed Medicare for its services submitted “false claims” within the 
meaning of the Federal False Claims Act); Lourdes Martinez & Nora A. Colangelo, Substandard 
Quality of Care Used as a Basis for False Claims Act and Criminal Liability in Nursing Homes, 7 
HEALTH L. NEWSLETTER (2002) (reviewing the use of substandard quality of care as a basis for 
Federal False Claims Act liability in the LTC context). 
 442 See, e.g., BETHANY CARSON & ELEANA DIAZ, GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, PAYOFF: HOW 
CONGRESS ENSURES PRIVATE PRISON PROFIT WITH AN IMMIGRANT DETENTION QUOTA 3 (2015), 
http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/reports/quota_report_final_digital.pdf [http://perma.
cc/6XTW-B889] (reporting that 62% percent of immigration detainee beds are located in private, 
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and DHS contractor exclusion ought to be more effective than ICE’s current 
unenforceable guidelines. 
DHS has several options for promulgating these regulations. A subsec-
tion within an existing regulation codified at subchapter B of DHS’s immi-
gration regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(e), offers one option. As currently 
written, this subsection only requires the “availability of emergency care” in 
detention centers that are not operated by ICE.443 DHS could delete the cur-
rent content of 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(e) and insert the eight regulations described 
above. DHS could also add the proposed regulations to a reserved, or newly 
created, Part within Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations. In either 
case, the regulations may be structured as follows: 
8 C.F.R. § [ ] 
(a) Basis and Scope 
(b) Definitions 
(c) Physical and Mental Health Examinations 
(d) Comprehensive, Written Plans of Care 
(e) Timely, Adequate Treatment 
(f) Minimum Staffing 
(g) Infection Control 
(h) Suicide Prevention 
(i) Complaints and Investigations 
(j) Penalties for Non-Compliance 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has carefully examined immigration detainees’ lack of ac-
cess to physical and mental health care, leading to the three primary conclu-
sions. First, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s current detention 
standards are legally unenforceable and substantively inadequate. Second, 
current proposals to improve detainee health and safety are based on consti-
tutional law, international human rights law, and tort law, which lack the 
specificity, enforceability, and ex ante perspective necessary to effect com-
prehensive detainee health reform. Third, involuntary commitment laws, 
long-term care requirements, and behavioral health laws provide a lens 
through which the lack of access to health care in detention might be as-
                                                                                                                           
for-profit detention centers); NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETEN-
TION: RUNAWAY COSTS FOR IMMIGRATION DETENTION DO NOT ADD UP TO SENSIBLE POLICIES 
7 (2013), https://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Math-of-Immigation-Detention-
August-2013-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/42GF-RED9] (reporting that Corrections Corporation 
of America and the GEO Group, Inc., the two largest detention contractors, reported annual reve-
nues of $1.8 billion and $1.5 billion, respectively, in fiscal year 2012). 
 443 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(e) (2014). 
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sessed and through which the unenforceable standards guiding detention 
centers might be improved. This Article makes eight recommendations that, 
if promulgated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security into legally 
enforceable regulations, would improve the health and safety of immigra-
tion detainees. 
Undoubtedly, these regulations will cause federal, state, and local pris-
ons and jails, private detention centers that contract with ICE, and ICE’s 
own detention centers to incur significant compliance costs. These regula-
tions also may reduce the number of preventable deaths in detention, an 
important balancing consideration. In the context of involuntary civil com-
mitment, courts do not allow a lack of resources to excuse a public or pri-
vate facility’s failure to provide adequate health care.444 The same rule 
should apply to immigration detention. Once the government takes an indi-
vidual into custody, the government has a legal obligation to provide ade-
quate physical and mental health care consistent with the standard of care to 
that individual.445 Absent adequate health care, immigration detention cen-
ters are little more than warehouses for illness and death. 
ICE has no legal obligation to provide health care to individuals in the 
community at large,446 including aliens who have been released on recogni-
zance, community support, or bond.447 These alternatives to detention are 
effective, inexpensive, and humane.448 Perhaps the administrative burdens 
to DHS associated with promulgating the regulations recommended by this 
Article, as well as the compliance costs to detention centers that necessarily 
will follow, will be the final push ICE needs to adopt community release 
and other safe alternatives to detention. 
                                                                                                                           
 444 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. at 784 (“The failure to provide suitable and ade-
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